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ANTITRUST AS CONSUMER PROTECTION

I. A Rule of Reason Requires Reasonable Rules
A. New Economic Theory v. Classic Antitrust Abuse
The Consumer Federation of America is procompetitive when it
comes to market structure and generally argues for a rule of reason
based on fundamentals of economic cost-benefits analysis.1 However,
good consumer economic analysis demands that the rule of reason be
based on reasonable rules. The analytic framework must be able to
comprehend basic empirical facts in a manner that coherently and
realistically integrates economic structure, conduct, and performance.
There should be no presumptions in favor of, or against business.
The discount rate should reflect the real rate of interest that
consumers can earn. The value of a person's time and risk of harm
should reflect the economic and intrinsic value of life. The Microsoft
case rewards this pragmatic approach to policy analysis handsomely.
At the outset of the trial in United States v. Microsoft,2 few would
have predicted the dramatic finding against Microsoft. Many who
viewed Microsoft as a dynamic, new economy business had difficulty
believing Microsoft had used plain old anti-competitive dirty tricks to
achieve its business success and were shocked when the court
concluded:
[O]nly when the separate categories of conduct are viewed, as they
should be, as a single, well-coordinated course of action does the

full extent of the violence that Microsoft has done to the
competitive process reveal itself. In essence, Microsoft mounted a
deliberate assault upon entrepreneurial efforts that, left to rise or
fall on their own merits, could well have enabled the introduction
of competition into the market for Intel-compatible PC operating
systems. While the evidence does not prove that they would have
1. In particular, the Consumer Federation of America has applied a similar analysis
to a variety of other "network" industries.

See, e.g., CONSUMER FEDERATION OF

AMERICA AND THE MEDIA ACCESS PROJECT, THE CONSUMER

MICROSOFT

(Oct.

1, 1998)

CASE AGAINST

http://www.consumerfed.org/publist.html;

CONSUMER

FEDERATION OF AMERICA AND CONSUMERS UNION, RESIDENTIAL CONSUMER
ECONOMICS
OF
ELECTRIC
UTILITY
RESTRUCTURING
(July
1998)
http://www.consumerfed.org/publist.html; CONSUMER FEDERATION OF AMERICA AND
CONSUMERS UNION, ELECTRICITY RESTRUCTURING AND THE PRICE SPIKES OF 1998

(June 21, 1999) http://www.consumerfed.org/publist.htm; CONSUMER FEDERATION OF
AMERICA, CONSUMER GROUPS UNITE TO OPPOSE THE SBC-AMERTECH MERGER

(Jan. 20, 1999) http:/Iwww.consumerfed.org/publist.htm; CONSUMER FEDERATION OF
AMERICA, BREAKING THE RULES:

AT&T'S ATTEMPT TO BUY A NATIONAL

MONOPOLY IN CABLE TV AND BROADBAND INTERNET SERVICES (Sept.

http://www.consumerfed.org/publist.html.
2. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 1999).

19,

1999)
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succeeded absent Microsoft's actions, it does reveal that Microsoft
placed an oppressive thumb on the scale of competitive fortune,
thereby effectively guaranteeing its continued dominance in the
relevant market. More broadly, Microsoft's anti-competitive
actions trammeled the competitive process through which the
innovation and
computer software industry generally stimulates
3
conduces to the optimum benefit of consumers.

Contrary to the claims of a recent headline in the New York
Times Book Review, Microsoft did not lose this case "by defending
too much too often."'4 It did not lose because of a remarkably inept
defense, 5 or because of allegations that crucial pieces of evidence
7
were rigged, 6 or because of an irrational or biased judge. It lost
because its acts were simply indefensible. The intent and effect of its
behavior was so blatantly anti-competitive and the economic
assumptions necessary to excuse it so narrow and unrealistic, that not
even a conservative judge-Ronald Reagan's first judicial
appointees-could do anything but find Microsoft guilty by a
reasonable interpretation of the antitrust rules (see Exhibit I-1). In
fact, numerous conservative antitrust thinkers have recognized that a
knee jerk defense of Microsoft is wrong, because it risks destroying all

3. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30, 44 (D.D.C. 2000) (citations
omitted).
4. Adam Liptak, Microsoft Lost Its Antitrust Case by Defending Too Much Too
Often, NY TIMES ON THE WEB, Feb. 4,2001, at http://www.nytimes.com.
5. See Rajiv Chandrasekaran, U.S., 19 States Discuss Possible Sanctions Plan for
Microsoft, WASH. POST, Feb. 15, 1999, at Al (using the word "stumbling" to describe the
presentation of Microsoft's defense); see also James V. Grimaldi, Some Observers Say
Microsoft Has Blown Its Case with Blunders, SEATrLE TIMES, Feb. 9, 1999, available at
http://archives.seattletimes.nwsource.com.
6. The most striking example of tainted evidence was the presentation of a videotape
which purported to show that the browser could not be removed without impairing the
function of the operating system. The witness presenting the video could not account for
discontinuities on the tape. JOHN HEILEMANN, PRIDE BEFORE THE FALL 181-86 (2001).
Microsoft never did sort out what had occurred, so it is unclear whether this was an honest
mistake or deception. Another incident, having to do with a survey that Microsoft had
commissioned to support its case, presented the court with a direct effort to mislead.
Microsoft appears to have developed a survey of browser users which was purposefully
intended to provide an after the fact defense of its behavior. Microsoft Rigged Survey?,
CNNFN, (Jan. 14, 1999), at http:llcnnfn.cnn.com/1999/01/14/technology/microsoftl. When
one of Microsoft's outside witnesses relied on this data in court, rather than the actual data
on which Microsoft's executives relied, the Judge was quite blunt in his rebuke. See
Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 101.
7. Interviews granted during the trial and public statements since have resulted in the
appeals court asking parties to comment on the judge's behavior.
8. KEN AULETrA, WORLD WAR 3.0, at 42 (2001).
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reasonable rules of a productively competitive marketplace, 9 and

warned allowing such behavior will undermine the fundamental

competitive dynamic that drives progress in our capitalist economy. 10
Microsoft attacked the fundamentals of antitrust, hiring the Dean
of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology business school and a

bevy of consultants' to present a theory that asked the court to
abandon its traditional view of competition and accept the
proposition that markets will inevitably be dominated by very few,
very large companies. They claimed that competition does not take
place within markets; the struggle is for the entire market. Market
domination is benign because firms enjoy the benefits of network
effects and virtuous circles of increasing productivity, while the fear of
being replaced as the industry leader drives even the dominant firm to
innovate and treat consumers just as well as traditional competition
for market share in old economy industries.12 Consequently,
Microsoft did not violate the antitrust laws, it was simply the winnertake-all nature of the industry that made it act this way and gave it
virtually no act could violate
market dominance. By this definition
3
industry.'
this
in
laws
antitrust
the
9. Robert Bork, The Most MisunderstoodAntitrust Case, WALL ST. J., May 22, 1998,
at A16; Dan Oliver, Necessary Gateskeeping,NAT'L REV., May 4, 1998, at 43.
10. Kenneth Starr, Progress and Freedom Foundation and the Brookings Institution,
Remarks, in Microsoft Antitrust Case and Computer Industry Competition, (C-SPAN
television broadcast, Feb. 22, 2001).
11. In the courtroom, Richard Schmalensee analyzed the market structure of the
software industry. See Report of Direct Testimony of Richard Schmalensee, United States
v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 1999) (Nos. CIV. A. 98-1232, 98-1233)
(relying on the empirical work of Bernard J. Reddy et al., Why Does Microsoft Charge So
Little for Windows?, NAT'L ECON. RESEARCH ASSOCS., Oct. 8, 1998. David S. Evans et
al., The Rise and Fall of Leaders in Personal Computer Software, NAT'L ECON.
RESEARCH AssoCs., Jan. 7, 1999, and Kenneth G. Elzinga & David E. Mills, PC
Software (Sept. 1998) (all prepared with support from Microsoft)).
12. STAN J.

LIEBOWITZ

&

STEPHEN E.

MARGOLIS,

WINNERS,

LOSERS &

MICROSOFT: COMPETITION AND ANTITRUST IN HIGH TECHNOLOGY 154-57 (1999)
[hereinafter LIEBOWITz & MARGOLIS, LOSERS].
13. As Schmalensee wrote in the American Economic Review, the month after the trial
ended:
Economists tend to define predatory acts as, roughly, acts that are rational
only if they chasten or eliminate competitors. Courts, aware of the cost of
discouraging competition, tend to require more, including short-term losses from
the acts at issue and plausible expectation of future recoupment of those losses.
Clear evidence of intent may help a court decide whether a particular act was
predatory. In Schumpeterian industries, however, with "winner take most"
markets, neither the basic definition above nor evidence of intent is economically
useful.
If there can be only one healthy survivor, the incumbent market leader must
exclude its competition or die. Any strategy that does not exclude competition
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Evidence at trial revealed that precisely the opposite was true.
Because the nature of the industry was not sufficient to entrench its
monopoly, Microsoft resorted to repeated, well-documented and
protracted campaigns of anti-competitive behaviors to squash its
competition. If network externalities would have been sufficient to
entrench Microsoft, the immense amount of managerial time and
effort and the hundreds of millions, if not billions, of dollars it burned
up foreclosing the market to competing products was wasted. It
should not have needed to use all these business strategies; it could
have relied on just delivering a better product in a networked
14

industry.
The trial also showed that Microsoft's claims to pursuing
consumer friendly business tactics that serve the public were
contradicted by its actions. If expanding demand for Windows by
promoting a complementary product was Microsoft's concern, it did
not have to spend hundreds of millions of dollars making sure the
dominant browser was Explorer, not Navigator. Since innovation
would be the key to any such "system" effects, Microsoft should
never have slowed its own products or prevented other products from
getting to market, since all innovation stimulates demand for

will not result in survival. There is no useful non-exclusion baseline, which the
traditional test for predation requires. Moreover, if near-monopoly is inevitable,
welfare is not generally increased by restraining the ferocity of competition for
that position, particularly if competition is channeled in directions that benefit
consumers, such as innovation or low prices.
As to intent, in a struggle for survival that will have only one winner, any firm
must exclude rivals to survive. The intent to exclude is the intent to survive. In a
"winner take most" market, evidence that A intends to kill B merely confirms
A's desire to survive.
Richard Schmalensee, Antitrust Issues in Schumpeterian Industries, 90 AM. ECON. REV.
192,193-94 (2000).
14. As the Economist pointed out, the picture of a new form of beneficial monopoly,
relying on network effects to dominate in a positive way, could not hide the reality of plain
vanilla monopoly power.
If network effects did in fact assure monopoly power, the Microsoft monopoly
in the operating-systems market would not have been illegal. Under the
Sherman Act, monopoly is lawful. It is actions to defend or extend monopoly
that break the law. On the view that bad standards are strongly self-reinforcing,
no such monopoly-defending action would have been needed....
New paradigm or old, the law has no quarrel with "natural monopolies." It is
precisely because network effects were not enough to entrench Microsoft's
monopoly-deliberate steps to stifle competition were required too-that the
company may face draconian penalties.
Antitrust on Trial, ECONOMIST, Nov. 13, 1999, at 84. A liberal, journalistic version of the
same conclusion can be found in Robert Kuttner, Bill Gates, Robber Baron, BUS. WK.,
Jan. 19, 1998, at 20.
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Windows. Microsoft should not have cared which brand was used. It
should certainly not have spent so much effort on forcing Navigator
out of the Mac market.
If bundling were important to expanding demand by creating
convenience and lowering costs, Microsoft should not have cared
which complements were bundled, since the better they all worked,
the greater the demand, but it repeatedly sought to prevent any
product, other than its own, from being bundled on new PCs. If
improved functionality and ease of use through integration of
complement products were critical to stimulating demand, Microsoft
should never have threatened to or actually withheld access to
interfaces or jolted non-Microsoft products since they needed to
function well to expand demand.
If Microsoft were seeking to increase revenues by steering
customers through its browser to its portal, it should never have given
AOL equal standing with MSN on the boot screen at no charge or
allowed OEMs to direct customers to their portals, as long as they
used Explorer, not Navigator.
If a pleasing consumer experience is important to expanding
demand, Microsoft would have heeded the entreaties of OEMs to
simplify and modify boot sequences, when they faced the wrath of
dissatisfied consumers, instead of paying them to put up with
consumer hassles. It would not have compromised the stability of the
operating system with excessive integration.
Microsoft illegally eliminated competition to defend and extend
its monopoly and imposed a heavy price on the public. Consequently,
application of traditional antitrust rules will achieve exactly the
reverse of what Microsoft claimed it would-it will promote
innovation by allowing potential competitors, who would otherwise
be quickly eliminated by the giant's anti-competitive behaviors, to
have a fair chance to enter the market and eventually discipline the
price and the quality of Microsoft's products.
B. Outline of the Article
This Article explains why the court had to reject Microsoft's
defense by placing the mountain of evidence presented in the trial in
5
a traditional structure-conduct-performance analytic framework.'
The clear analytic base undermines the claim that the monopoly
15. F.M. SCHERER & DAVID Ross, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 4 (1990); see also WILLIAM G. SHEPHERD, THE ECONOMICS
OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 5 (1985).
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persists because of the unique natural tendencies of a new economy
software market. It also provides the foundation for an effective
remedy to restore competition in the software industry.
Section II presents an overview of the empirical facts within the
structure/conduct/performance paradigm. Section III presents a
discussion of the anti-competitive business model imposed by
Microsoft on the software industry. Section IV presents a discussion
of how this business model imposed harm on the public. Section V
evaluates the remedy adopted by the court and extracts lessons for
future antitrust activity in high technology industries.
H. Market Structure Conditions for Monopoly
A. Workably Competitive Markets: Structure-Conduct-Performance

The structure-conduct-performance (SCP) approach to the
analysis of industry structure has been the dominant public policy
paradigm in the United States for the better part of this century. 16 In

SCP analysis the central concern is with market performance, since
that is the outcome that affects consumers most directly. The concept
of performance is multifaceted; it includes both efficiency and
fairness. The measures of performance to which we traditionally look
are pricing and profits, addressing both efficiency and fairness. They
are the most direct measure of how society's wealth is being allocated
and distributed. 17
The performance of industries is determined by a number of
factors, most directly the conduct of market participants. 18 Do they
compete? What legal tactics do they employ? How do they advertise
and price their products?
Conduct is primarily a product of other factors. Conduct is
affected and circumscribed by market structure. Market structure
includes an analysis of the number and size of the firms in the
industry, their cost characteristics and barriers to entry, as well as the
basic conditions of supply and demand.' 9
The focal point of market structure analysis is to assess the ability
of markets to support competition, which "has long been viewed as a
force that leads to an ideal solution of the economic performance
16. The Consumer Federation of America has applied a similar analysis to a variety of
"network" industries. See e.g., supra note 1.
17. SCHERER & Ross, supranote 15, at 4.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 5.
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problem, and monopoly has been condemned." 20 The predominant
reason for the preference for competitive markets reflects the
economic performance they generate, although there are political
reasons to prefer such markets as well.21 In particular, competition
fosters efficient allocation of resources, absence of excess profit,
lowest cost production and provides a strong incentive to innovate. 22
Where competition breaks down, firms are said to have market power
and the market falls short of these results.23
Pure and perfect competition is rare, but the competitive goal is
important. 24 Therefore, a great deal of attention has been focused on
the relative competitiveness of markets and conditions that make
markets more competitive or workably competitive. Summarizing
the literature, Scherer and Ross develop the following useful list of
these characteristics:
Structural Criteria
The number of traders should be at least as large as scale
economies permit.
There should be no artificial inhibitions on mobility and entry.
There should be moderate and price-sensitive quality differentials
in products offered.
Conduct Criteria
Some uncertainty should exist in minds of rivals as to whether price
initiatives will be followed.
Firms should strive to attain their goals independently, without
collusion.
There should be no unfair, exclusionary, predatory, or coercive
tactics.
Inefficient suppliers and customers should not be shielded
permanently.
Sales promotions should be informative, or at least not misleading.
There should be no persistent, harmful price discrimination.
Performance Criteria
Firms' production and distribution operations should be efficient
and not wasteful of resources.

20. 111 atl5.
21. Id. at 18.

22. Id. at 4, 20.
23. Id at 17-18.
24. Id at 16-17.
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Output levels and product quality (that is variety, durability, safety,
reliability, and so forth) should be responsive to consumer
demands.
Profits should be at levels just sufficient to reward investment,
efficiency, and innovation.
Prices should encourage rational choice, guide markets toward
equilibrium, and not intensify cyclical instability.
Opportunities for introducing technically superior new products
and processes should be exploited.
Promotional expenses should not be excessive.
Success should accrue to sellers who best serve consumer wants.25
Claims of Unique Competition in New Economy Industries
As noted in the introduction, Microsoft's experts in court argued
for a new form of workable competition in the software industry.
Schmalensee/NERA present a picture of dynamic competition in the
software industry in which
[c]ompetition in the software industry is based on sequential races
for the leadership of categories such as word processing,
spreadsheets, personal financial software, games, operating
systems, and utilities-not to mention currently unknown
categories from which the next generation of "killer applications"
26
will emerge.
Outside of the courtroom, a conservative think tank gave
prominence to the arguments in a book entitled, Winners, Losers and
Microsoft (hereafter referred to as Losers).27 The authors argue that
in the software industry, competition never achieves an equilibrium
between companies within a market. Rather competition simply
takes place for the entire market. Leaders change when they produce
superior products and they capture the entire market.
Because bigger is better in increasing-returns industries, such
industries evolve into monopolies. Monopoly, however, does not
lead inevitably to a bad economic outcome for society....
Sometimes an industry develops in such a way that monopoly is not
only a likely outcome but also a desirable one. In such industries,
what we are likely to witness is not conventional monopoly, but
rather serial monopoly. 28
B.

25. Id at 53-54.

26. Report of Direct Testimony of Richard Schmalensee, supra n6te 11, at 17.
27. LIEBOWITZ & MARGOLIS, LOSERS, supra note 12.

28. Id. at 10-11.
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Such markets will ...be "winner-take-all," but only for a while.
29

That is, they will exhibit serialmonopoly.
Losers purports to show that Microsoft products win in the
marketplace because they are higher in quality and that the presence
of Microsoft in the marketplace causes prices to decline.
In the special environment of serial monopoly, monopolisticlooking firms that offer an inferior deal to consumers are readily
replaced. In such circumstances, an attempt to exploit a monopoly
by restricting output and raising price is suicidal. Further, in the
environment of serial monopoly, firms, even monopolistic ones, will
end up decreasing their profits if they handicap their products in
some way. For example, if they unwisely bundle goods into their
product that cost more than they are worth, given the available
alternatives, they will lose out. In short, in the environment of
serial monopoly (unlike conventional monopoly) the punishment
for inferior products, elevated prices or inefficient bundling is
30
obsolescence and replacement.
This view claims that the anti-competitive practices Microsoft
used have nothing to do with the monopoly outcome.
In other software markets, we have consistently found that market
share is strongly related to product quality and that market share
responds quickly to quality differentials. We would expect a similar
relationship in the browser market....
Given all this-the quality advantage of Internet Explorer, the
enhanced ability of users to switch products, and the ease of
providing additional copies of browsers-Internet Explorer's
increase in market share can quite easily be explained. One does
not need to appeal to other factors such as those the government
has focused on in its case against Microsoft (that is, ownership of
the operating system or exclusionary contracts) to explain
Microsoft's increasing share of the market. 31
This argument builds on recent new economic theory that
challenges the traditional competitive market model. This school of
thought, drawing on the works of Schumpeter, 32 argues that "firms
need protection from competition before they will bear the risks and
costs of invention and innovation, and a monopoly affords an ideal
29. Id. at 137.
30. Id. at 11.
31. Id. at 219-22.
32.

(1942).

See,

e.g., JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY
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platform for shooting at the rapidly and jerkily moving targets of new
'33
technology.
It argues that basic conditions are so different that the idea of
competition among a substantial number of competitors is rendered
obsolete. The recent theory holds that in some industries, under
some conditions, a dominant firm and a dominant technology can
lead to a "virtuous circle" in which positive externalities feed on
themselves to propel economic progress. 34 By organizing demand
around a standard product, the cost of production falls.
In the computer hardware industry positive feedback loops
sustain change and productivity growth that are orders of magnitude
larger than typified the industrial age.35 Advances in computing
36
technology support more advances in computing technology.
Standardized and pre-installed bundles of software appear to have
allowed the rapidly expanding capabilities of computer hardware to
become accessible and useful to consumers with little expertise in
computing.37

As more and more people use the product, the value to each
increases, especially in communications and network industries where
people talk to one another. The classic case is the telephone network
(or the Internet), where each individual derives greater benefit
38
through the ability to contact numerous other individuals directly.
There may be indirect benefits in virtual networks in which two
consumers never actually come face-to-face or computer-tocomputer. Support services, maintenance and repair, as well as
libraries of applications become more readily available. Larger
numbers of users seeking specialized applications create a larger

33. SCHERER & Ross, supra note 15, at 31.
34. The arguments have been explicitly applied to the Microsoft case. See John E.
Lopatka & William Page, Microsoft, Monopolization, and Network Externalities: Some
Uses and Abuses of Economic Theory in Antitrust Decisionmaking,40 ANTITRUST BULL.
265 (1995).
35. Brian R. Gaines, The Learning Curve Underlying Convergence, 1998
TECHNOLOGICAL FORECASTING AND SOCIAL CHANGE 30-31.
36. Brian Arthur, Positive Feedbacksin the Economy, SI. AM., Feb. 1990, at 95-96.
37. Michael Katz & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust and Software Markets, in COMPETITION,
INNOVATION

AND THE MICROsOFr

MONOPOLY:

ANTITRUST AND THE DIGITAL

MARKETPLACE (Jeffrey A. Eisenbach & Thomas M. Lenard eds., 1999) [hereinafter Katz
& Shapiro, Antitrustand Software].
38. Jeffrey Church & Neil Gandal, Complementary Network Externalities and
TechnologicalAdoption, 11 INT'LJ. INDUS. ORG. 239,241 (1993).
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library of applications that become available to other users,39 and
secondary markets may be created.
By increasing the number of units sold, the cost per unit falls
dramatically.4° On the supply side, certain industries, like computing
and networking industries, tend to have high fixed and front end
costs. Cost savings apply not only to initial production costs, but also
to service and maintenance costs.41 As the installed base of hardware
and software deployed grows, learning and training in the dominant
technology is more valuable since it can be applied to more users and
uses.42 Firms seek to capture these positive externalities and
accomplish technological "lock-in." 43 After capturing the first
generation of customers and building a customer and programming
base tied to dominant software, it becomes difficult, if not impossible,
for later technologies to overcome this advantage. Customers
hesitate to abandon their investments in the dominant technology and
customer acquisition costs rise for latecomers.
HI. Economic Theory v. Business Reality
A. Market Structure
(1) Market Dominance

Painting a picture of empirical reality to support the theory
proved a difficult proposition for Microsoft's expert witness. Citing
work commissioned by Microsoft at National Economic Research
Associates (NERA), Schmalensee argued that Microsoft's current
market dominance was not a source of market power because entry
into the software industry is easy.44 He tried to demonstrate this by
presenting a historical analysis of software category leaders and
cataloguing the availability of alternatives. When Windows 95
replaced Windows 3.0, Schmalensee/NERA claimed, there was a
change in leadership, even though Microsoft develops, markets, and
controls both products.
39. Id.; see also Chou Chien-fu & Oz Shy, Network Effects Without Network
Externalities,8 INT'L J. INDUS. ORG. 259,260 (1990).
40. Arthur, supra note 36, at 92-93.
41. Melissa A. Schilling, Technological Lockout: An Integrative Model of the
Economic and Strategic Factors Driving Technology Success and Failure, 23 ACAD.
MGMT. REV. 267,270 (1998).

42. Id.
43. HAL VARIAN & KARL SHAPIRO, INFORMATION RULES (1999).
44. Report of Direct Testimony of Richard Schmalensee, supra note 11, at 18-20.
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The objective was to give the impression that leadership is always
changing hands in the software industry and that Microsoft is just one
of the companies that could be replaced at any moment. Thus,
Schmalensee/NERA attempted to show that fourteen different
products dominate the five major software categories and no product
dominates for long. According to this view, every category but one
has at least three leaders. Most periods of leadership are short, less
than a decade.
There is simply no justification to consider a change in the model
of a product a change in market leadership or domination. When
markets are viewed through the lens of the firm the picture is quite
different (see Exhibit III-1). There are eight firms that have held a
leadership position in one or more categories. There is only one firm
that totally dominates the landscape.
Microsoft has dominated the operating system category for
sixteen years and still does. No other firm has come close to
replicating either Microsoft's market share or its period of
dominance. Five generations of Intel-based PCs have seen no change
in the dominant firm.
Microsoft is the only firm to achieve a market share exceeding
90%, first in the operating system and then in the office suite. It is the
only firm to achieve the generally accepted monopoly level of 65-70%
in more than one software market.
Microsoft is the only firm to dominate more than one category
on the list. It dominates four of the five simultaneously and has never
relinquished domination once it conquers a market.
Microsoft is the only firm on the list that purchased, rather than
created, the basic programs in virtually every category it dominated.
In the one area where Microsoft has not achieved dominance,
personal finance programs, it attempted to buy the industry leader
but was rebuffed by the Department of Justice. The reason it has
Schmalensee
failed to dominate this area is also revealing.
recognized that personal finance software is not as heavily subject to
network externalities. 45 Microsoft is less able to leverage its market
power over the operating system to conquer this market, perhaps that
is why it failed.
When Schmalensee analyzed the installed base of users, he gave
a similarly distorted view.46 He simply left out Microsoft's base. He
identified approximately twenty-three million non-Microsoft users,
45. Id. at 39.
46. Id. at 50-55.
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split roughly equally between Mac and others. 47 The suggestion is
that the non-Microsoft market is large enough to provide a base for
competition. This approach is misleading, since the Microsoft
installed base is at least twelve times as large as the combined
competition, and could be as much as twenty times as large depending
on what one assumes about the life-span of computers (see Exhibit
II-2). It is approximately twenty-five times as large as the next
largest competitor. It is over thirty times as large as the next largest
PC-based competitor. Given the huge advantage in economies of
scale attendant on such a base, it is extremely difficult for entrants to
build a business on the basis of the non-Microsoft installed base. 48 A
realistic analysis of industry leadership contradicts the Microsoft view.
There is no "serial" in Microsoft's monopoly.
(2) Barriersto Entry

As unconvincing as the market structure analysis was, the second
prong of the Microsoft argument was even weaker. Microsoft's
defenders claimed that its dominant market position and extremely
high market share do not constitute a basis for the exercise of market
power because entry and exit in the software industry are extremely
problems and network effects are
easy. Switching costs, compatibility
49
not substantial entry barriers.
Microsoft executives knew full well that each of the problems
that Schmalensee/NERA dismissed is actually a "huge" barrier.
Through their words and deeds Microsoft's senior executives
demonstrated that they believed the opposite of what the experts said
and acted in exactly the opposite manner in the market. Microsoft's
witnesses asked the court to disregard their words and deeds and
believe that Microsoft executives did not understand their own
market.
In a December 1997 memorandum, the Senior VP responsible
for pricing to Microsoft's most important customers-computer
manufacturers (original equipment manufacturers or OEMs) -

47. Id. at 54.
48. The discussion of the number of available programs is similarly distorted.
Schmalensee/NERA identify thousands of programs available for competing operating
systems. Mac is identified with about 12,000 programs in 1998. See Report of Direct
Testimony of Richard Schmalensee, supra note 11, at 54. Windows had twice as many
programs available five years ago. See Declaration of David Sibley at 14, United States v.
Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 1999) (Nos. CIV. A. 98-1232, 98-1233) (citing a
figure of 25,000 for 1993).
49. Report of Direct Testimony of Richard Schmalensee, supranote 11, at 55-63.
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concluded that Microsoft's high prices were protected by a variety of
barriers to entry.5 0 Although computer manufacturers had an
incentive to compete in operating systems because of Microsoft's high
prices, they faced problems of consumer switching costs. 51 Software
vendors were stymied by compatibility problems.5 2 Even Intel could
not compete in operating systems,53 since Microsoft could respond to
such a threat by using its deep pockets to buy a chip manufacturer
and bolt its operating system onto the CPU, leveraging control of
compatibility to defend and extend its monopoly. 54 So much for the

50. Government Exhibit #365: Memorandum from Joachim Kempin to Bill Gates,
dated Dec. 16, 1997, United States v. Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 1999) (Nos. CIV.
A. 98-1232, 98-1233); see also Mary Jo Foley, Who is Microsoft's Secret Power Broker?,
ZDNET, Feb. 1, 1998 (describing Joachim Kempin by saying "he has the final sign-off on
all Microsoft licensing contracts with all hardware makers ... and he is the Microsoft
official around whom swirls most of the current Microsoft vs. DOJ fireworks").
51. Government Exhibit #365: Memorandum from Joachim Kempin to Bill Gates,
dated Dec. 16, 1997, United States v. Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 1999) (Nos. CIV.
A. 98-1232, 98-1233).
Our high price could get a single OEM or a coalition to fund a competing effort.
While this possibility exists I consider it doubtful even if they could get a product
out that they can market it successfully, leapfrog us and would not deviate them
from their own standard. Could they convince customers to change their
computing platform is the real question. The existing investments in training,
infrastructure and applications in windows computing are huge and will create a
lot of inertia.
Id.
52. Id
SUN and its coalition with Java. For the next 2-3 years the barriers are huge...
In addition there is the compatibility barrier... [Netscape] may come from the
browser side, but I consider them too weak to succeed alone-so they are only
dangerous if they team up with SUN. Again compatibility and yet another
platform are the biggest inhibitors.
Id.
53. Id.
This could be an INTEL led and funded coalition-say with Compaq and
Netscape. I am convinced they have been thinking about this for some time.
They could buy SUN SOFT or start a skunk work project on their own. If they
decide to sell the Operating System for $1 and the CPU for $200 they will get the
OEMs on their side. The customer inertia argument remains and that will
prevent them to build momentum easily.
Id.
54. Id.
Our reaction could be to buy National semiconductor or AMD or both and own
the CPU and the SW business-while both stocks are taking a dive. We would
sell SW at $100 and CPU at cost +1. How sure are we of our partnership and
how fast could we react if needed? We could bring compatibility to another
platform better than anybody else and we would have the money to fund the
fabrication capacity.
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claim that a brilliant computer science major in his garage can
Compaq, Sun
displace Microsoft; 55 not even the combination of Intel,
56
and Netscape can overcome these barriers to entry.
B. Corporate Conduct
(1) The War Against the Browser

Microsoft's defense of its conduct relies on a claim that it just
competes very hard in every product market it enters.57 Its experts
place a great deal of emphasis on product quality. Microsoft's
domination of product lines is attributed to the fact that, while it

starts behind in most products, it develops equal quality and then
wins the market. 58 The whole market tips to Microsoft, once their
product is superior.59 In particular, Losers claims that 60by 1996
Internet Explorer had pulled equal with Netscape Navigator.
As with the evidence on market structure, the direct evidence on
conduct refutes the claims of Microsoft experts with great specificity.
Contradicting the theory, this was the very moment at which
Microsoft executives were redoubling their efforts to use their "other
factor" leverage to drive Netscape from the market. 61 Competing on

quality was not at all what Microsoft had in mind. Foreclosing the
market was. Microsoft went to great lengths to bring that result
about.

55. Report of Direct Testimony of Richard Schmalensee, supranote 11, at 47.
56. In this regard, the fact that Microsoft has successfully prevented Intel from
developing its NSP software as disclosed in the trial is a very important element of the
overall case. Intel could not, over Microsoft's objection, even bring a new piece of
software to market in a field that Microsoft did not dominate. The chances it could bring a
competing system to market are even smaller. See Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 94-103.
57. Report of Direct Testimony of Richard Schmalensee, supra note 11, at 127.
58. Id.
59. See LIEBOWITZ & MARGOLIS, LOSERS, supra note 12, at 165-73.
60. 1& at 217-23.
61. See Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 51 (quoting messages from James Allchin to Paul
Maritz).
I don't understand how IE [Internet Explorer] is going to win. The current path
is simply to copy everything that Netscape does packaging and product wise....
We are not leveraging Windows from a marketing perspective and we are trying
to copy Netscape and make IE into a platform. We do not use our strengthwhich is that we have an installed base of Windows and we have a strong OEM
shipment channel for Windows. I am convinced we have to use Windows-this is
the one thing they don't have... We have to be competitive with features, but
we need something more-Windows integration.
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The evidence at trial focuses on Microsoft's battle to prevent
Netscape/Java from becoming a threat to the Microsoft monopoly
through insertion into the middle of the market, 62 although the
evidence indicates that the abusive business model affected many
markets over the course of at least a decade. 63 The CEO of the
company made it clear that the browser was a competitive threat to
Microsoft's dominant position.
A new competitor "born" on the Internet is Netscape. Their
browser is dominant, with 70% usage share, allowing them to
determine which network extensions will catch on. They are
pursuing a multi-platform strategy, where they move the key 64
API
into the client to commoditize the underlying operating system.
As Microsoft saw it, Netscape/JAVA could weaken its hold on
the market because they were able to insert themselves between the
Windows operating system and the applications that ran on top of it.
They are "middleware." They offer independent software vendors
(ISVs) the possibility of writing applications that can work with many
operating systems. They do this by making available to programmers
the applications programming interfaces (APIs). When APIs are
exposed, programmers can "call" them to develop new applications.
Because they hope to be compatible with numerous operating
systems and hope to support many applications, these "middleware"
programs make consumers indifferent to which operating system is
used. This threatens to weaken Microsoft's hold on the market. In its
terms, it "commoditizes" its core product. If a competitor can create
a stock of compatible applications, he can advertise that the new
operating system can run all the existing programs, undermining the
economic leverage of Windows. If the installed base of platforms and
browsers are out there, the Windows operating system could be
bypassed. By capturing the browser market, Microsoft precluded that
possibility. The campaign against Netscape simultaneously extended
the monopoly into the browser market and defended the monopoly in
the operating system market by preserving the barrier to entry.

62. See id. at 28-29.
63. See generally JENNIFER EDSTROM & MARLIN ELLER, BARBARIANS LED BY BILL
GATES (1998); WENDY GOLDMAN RoHM, THE MICROSOFT FILE (1998); RANDALL E.
STRoss, THE MICROSOFT WAY (1997); JOHN WALLACE & JIM ERICKSON, HARD DRIVE

(1992).
64. Government Exhibit #20: Memorandum from Bill Gates, The Internet Tidal
Wave, dated May 26, 1995, United States v. Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 1999)
(Nos. CIV. A. 98-1232, 98-1233) [hereinafter Internet Tidal Wave].
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Microsoft's first response to the growth of the Internet and the

development of the browser as a threat to its operating monopoly
appears to have been to attempt to divide the market or gain a mutual
non-aggression agreement. 65 That is, it sought to convince a
competitor to go in one direction, while it went in another. There are
at least four examples in the evidence in which Microsoft sought to
divide the market. Microsoft attacked Intel's contemplation of
developing software applications, denying consumers functionalities
for years. 66 Apple software efforts were also the object of Microsoft
efforts to divide markets.67 IBM was a particular target for Microsoft
68
efforts to seal off its market.
If the market division proposal was turned down, Microsoft
threatened to go into the competitors' line of business more
vigorously. While the attack on Netscape was the central focus of the
69
case, other instances also involved major players in the industry. 70
Using the operating system as the core of its market power,
Microsoft erects barriers to entry. It freezes out competitors with
incompatibilities, 71 builds in features to impede or disable competing
programs, 72 withdraws support for competitor programs,73 and locks
customers in with constant imitation of competing products74 or
promises to imitate them.75 These practices make it difficult for
competitors to design products that operate well as the operating

65. Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 30-31.
66. Id. at 34.
67. Id. at 36.
68. Id. at 28-43.
69. Id. at 34-44.
70. EDSTROM & ELLER, supra note 63, at 207.
71. The World According to Microsoft,PC WK. ONLINE, June 8,1998.
72. The practices span at least three generations of operating systems. It began with
the "scare message" in Windows 3.1 to makes DR-DOS users "feel uncomfortable and
when he has bugs, suspect the problem is DR-DOS and then go out and buy MS-DOS or
decide not to take the risk for the other machines he has to buy for his office." ROHM,
supra note 63, at 89. Windows 95 and Windows 98 have apparently disabled competitors'
programs rather than warn about possible incompatibilities. See James Gleick, Making
Microsoft Safe for Capitalism, 1996 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV. 71, 81; Windows 98
Disables Microsoft Competitors' Software, CNET, July 4,19981.
73. ROHM, supra note 63, at 69,70; Mine All Mine, TIME, June 5, 1995.
74. See Willow A. Sheremata, Barriers to Innovation: A Monopoly, Network
Externalities,and the Speed of Innovation, 42 ANTITRUST BULL. 937,941,964,967 (1997)
[hereinafter Sheremata, Barriersto Innovation].
75. The preannouncement issue received considerable attention during the first
federal action against Microsoft. ELLER & EDSTROM, supra note 63, at 42-43; WALLACE
& ERICKSON, supra note 63, at 240-48.
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system is manipulated and changed. 76 There also have been charges

of back room campaigns of intimidation,77 abrogation of contracts, 78
patent infringement, 79 and predatory pricing, in which the profits
from the monopoly over the operating system are used to drive
80
competitors out of other software lines.

As was its practice, when Microsoft's overture to divide the
market with Netscape was rebuffed, it set out to market a browser of

its own using its well-tested strategy of tying applications to its
operating system product.81 There is no evidence that Microsoft's
Internet browser was superior in any way to its competitors.

The

preservation of its operating system monopoly was the driving force
in Microsoft's entry into the browser market. This is the core of the

case against Microsoft. 82 Being an innovative leader was not how this
battle was to be won,83 leverage and tying were the key, 84 including
76. EDSTROM & ELLER, supra note 63, at 117. ROHM, supra note 63, at 187 recounts
the complaints about the desktop applications. Gleick, supra note 72, at 87 notes a similar
phenomenon with respect to the Internet.
77. ROHM, supra note 63, at 148,237,270.
78. The line between imitation and abrogation of contracts or patent infringement has
never been very clear in Microsoft's business model and has resulted in repeated disputes
including court cases involving Stac Electronics, ROHM, supra note 63, at 147-151, as well
as settlements of similar claims including CPM, see JOHN WALLACE, OVERDRIVE 41
(1997) and ROHM, supra note 63, at 41, and others such as pen-based systems, see ROHM,
supra note 63, at 93-101, and hardware, see WALLACE & ERICKSON, supranote 63, at 390.
79. See ROHM, supra note 63, at 93-101, 147-51; Alan Akin, Microsoft and 3D
Graphics: A Case Study in Suppressing Innovation and Competition, July 16, 1997 (posted
on Boycott Microsoft available at http://www.vcnet.comlbmslfeaturesl); Microsoft's
strategy, also known as "embrace and extend," is not new. Gates first mentioned it
publicly in Mine All Mine, TIME, June 5,1998.
80. WALLACE, supra note 78, at 162-65.
81. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9,43 (D.D.C. 1999).
82. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30,52-57 (D.D.C. 2000).
Microsoft paid vast sums of money, and renounced many millions more in lost
revenue every year, in order to induce firms to take actions that would help
enhance Internet Explorer's share of browser usage at Navigator's expense....
In fact, Microsoft has expended wealth and foresworn opportunities to realize
more in a manner and to an extent that can only represent a rational investment
if its purpose was to perpetuate the applications barrier to entry. Because
Microsoft's business practices "would not be considered profit maximizing except
for the expectation that... the entry of potential rivals" into the market for
Intel-compatible PC operating systems will be "blocked or delayed," Microsoft's
campaign must be termed predatory.
Id.
83. Id. at 160.
First we need to offer a decent client (O'Hare) that exploits Windows 95
shortcuts. However, that alone won't get people to switch away from Netscape.
We need to figure how to integrate Blackbird, and help browsing into our
Internet client.... We need to move all of our Internet value added from the
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efforts to undermine the quality of the competing product. 85
Integration was a business strategy 86 to foreclose a competitor,

including a delay in the release of Windows 98 until Internet Explorer
4.0 was ready to be included with that product, even though it hurt
Microsoft's most important customers, the OEMs. 87
The trial fully documented a campaign to cut off a potential
competitor's air supply by making it difficult to sell, find, or use his
products, by shutting down distribution channels, denying advertising
and promotion channels, undermining its functionality, denying it
resources and causing it to expend resources. Microsoft carried out
its war against this and other middleware threats by attempting to

ensure that no PC industry participants would in any way support or
assist Netscape/JAVA. s8
At the heart of Microsoft's anti-competitive practices are four
categories of abuses.
First, Microsoft took steps to prevent
Plus pack into Windows 95 itself as soon as we possibly can with a major goal to
get OEMs shipping our browser preinstalled.
Id.
84. Id.
If you agree that Windows is a huge asset, then it follows quickly that we are not
investing sufficiently in finding ways to tie IE and Windows together... most
importantly it must be killer on OEM shipments so that Netscape never gets a
chance on these systems.
Id. at 166.
85. Id.
Microsoft's executives believed that the incentives that its contractual restrictions
placed on OEMs would not be sufficient in themselves to reverse the direction of
Navigator's usage share. Microsoft set out to bind Internet Explorer more tightly
to Windows 95 as a technical matter. The intent was to make it more difficult for
anyone, including systems administrators and users, to remove Internet Explorer
from Windows 95 and to simultaneously complicate the experience of using
Navigator with Windows 95. As Brad Chase, Vice President for developers and
windows marketing, wrote to his superiors near the end of 1995, "We will bind
the shell to the Internet Explorer, so that running any other browser is a jolting
experience."
Id. at 160.
86. Id. at 167.
87. Id.
Maritz recognized that the delay would disappoint OEMs. First, while OEMs
were eager to sell new hardware technologies to Windows users, they could not
do this until Microsoft released Windows 98, which included software support for
the new technologies. Second, OEMs wanted Windows 98 to be released in time
to drive sales of PC systems during the back-to-school and holiday selling
seasons. Nevertheless, Maritz agreed with Allchin's point that synchronizing the
release of Windows 98 with Internet Explorer was "the only thing that makes
sense even if OEMs suffer."
88. Id. at 58-85.
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competitors from getting the same access to users of computers or
services who had entered into an agreement with Microsoft. If
OEMs, ISPs, or ICPs were inclined to install other browsers,
Microsoft sought to ensure that no browser would have equal
placement. 89 Second, it sought to foreclose distribution channels to
other browsers altogether. Contracting parties were required to ship
IE, and dissuaded from shipping competing browsers. 90 Third, it took
actions which were intended to ensure IE's quality was superior to
browsers operating on Windows machines. Contracts required use of
software that gave Microsoft a superior presentation, while the
underlying software also disabled competitors.91 Finally, there were
conditions to prevent competitors from garnering resources. 92
The quality analysis presented by Microsoft defenders is
undercut by the trial evidence. It shows that Microsoft may have
"won" the trade press reviews not so much because it built a better

mouse trap but because it impaired the ability of its competitors to
build one.93 At exactly the time that the trade press reviews of

Microsoft's browser were catching the reviews of Netscape's browser,
Microsoft had launched a campaign to undermine the quality of its
competition. Not only did Microsoft manipulate the operating system
to give its product an advantage, it denied or slowed access to its
operating system to prevent Netscape from improving and delivering
its product.94
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id. at 59-67.
Id. at 67-69.

Id. at 49-53.
Id. at 51.
93. Id. at 111-12.
94. Id.
Although Netscape declined the special relationship with Microsoft, its
executives continued over the weeks following the June 21 meeting to plead for
the RNA API. Despite Netscape's persistence, Microsoft did not release the
API to Netscape until late October, ie., as Allard had warned, more than three
months later. The delay in turn forced Netscape to postpone the release of its
Windows 95 browser until substantially after the release of Windows 95 (and
Internet Explorer) in August 1995. As a result, Netscape was excluded from
most of the holiday selling season.
Microsoft similarly withheld a scripting tool that Netscape needed to make its
browser compatible with certain dial-up ISPs. Microsoft had licensed the tool
freely to ISPs that wanted it, and in fact had cooperated with Netscape in
drafting a license agreement that, by mid-July 1996, needed only to be signed by
an authorized Microsoft executive to go into effect. There the process halted,
however. In mid-August, a Microsoft representative informed Netscape that
senior executives at Microsoft had decided to link the grant of the license to the
resolution of all open issues between the companies. Netscape never received a
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In addition, the court makes the point that under the weight of
the anti-competitive onslaught, Microsoft's competitors were forced
to give up. Squeezed out of the market and drained of resources, they
could no longer afford to devote resources to the product.
Not only did Microsoft prevent Navigator from undermining the
applications barrier to entry, it inflicted considerable harm on
Netscape's business in the process. By ensuring that the firms
comprising the channels that lead most efficiently to browser usage
distributed and promoted Internet Explorer to the virtual exclusion
of Navigator, Microsoft relegated Netscape to more costly and less
effective methods of distributing and promoting its browsing
software. After Microsoft started licensing Internet Explorer at no
charge, not only to OEMs and consumers, but also to IAPs, ISVs,
ICPs, and even Apple, Netscape was forced to follow suit. Despite
the fact that it did not charge for Internet Explorer, Microsoft could
still defray the massive costs it was undertaking to maximize usage
share with the vast profits earned licensing Windows. Because
Netscape did not have that luxury, it could ill afford the dramatic
drop in revenues from Navigator, much less to pay for the
inefficient modes of distribution to which Microsoft had consigned
it. The financial constraints also deterred Netscape from
undertaking technical innovations that it might otherwise have
implemented in Navigator. Microsoft was not altogether surprised,
had
then, when it learned in November 1998 that Netscape
95
surrendered itself to acquisition by another company.
It is impossible to argue that quality won the day in the browser
market. There is no way to know what would have happened in a
marketplace where fair competition was taking place, although
Microsoft's executives clearly believed that if they did not leverage
their market power in the operating system, they would lose the
96
browser war.
(2) SmartSuite
Antitrust courts can look at past patterns of behavior, both in
reaching conclusions about current conduct and in crafting
remedies. 97 Another product that makes a significant appearance in
the court case (and Losers) is IBM's SmartSuite. The court concludes

license to the scripting tool, and as a result, was unable to do business with
certain ISPs for a time.
Id at 33-34.

95. Id. at 103-04.

96. See id at 51.
97. Id at 34.
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that Microsoft leveraged its control over the operating system to
attack this product. Over this period, IBM's ability and intention to
preinstall an office suite brought retaliation from Microsoft and
reduced its shipment of computers substantially. 98
The IBM PC Company had begun negotiations with Microsoft for a
Windows 95 license in late March 1995. For the first two months,
the negotiations had progressed smoothly and at an expected pace.
After IBM announced its intention to acquire Lotus, though, the
Microsoft negotiators began canceling meetings with their IBM
counterparts, failing to return telephone calls, and delaying the
return of marked-up license drafts that they received from IBM.
Then, on July 20, 1995, just three days after IBM announced its
intention to pre-install SmartSuite on its PCs, a Microsoft executive
informed his counterpart at the IBM PC Company that Microsoft
was terminating further negotiations with IBM for a license to
Windows 95. Microsoft also refused to release to the PC Company
the Windows 95 "golden master" code. The PC Company needed
the code for its product planning and development, and IBM
executives knew that Microsoft had released it to IBM's OEM
competitors on July 17. Microsoft's purported reason for halting
the negotiations was that it wanted first to resolve an ongoing audit
of IBM's past royalty payments to Microsoft for several different
99
operating systems.
Thus, as in the case of the browser, Microsoft centered its
attention on denying a competing product the easiest means of
distribution-preinstallation. Microsoft sought to prevent IBM from
preinstalling its office suite on its computers. Interestingly, this battle
to convince IBM not to preinstall its office suite was essentially an
attempt to divide the market, to have IBM focus on being a hardware
company and stay out of the software business. The instruments that
Microsoft used to undermine IBM's preinstallation of a competing
product are familiar-delay and desupport by leveraging the
operating system.
This is not the only reason that Microsoft's Office came to
dominate this market, but it was a landmark on Microsoft's abusive
timeline. This was a crucial moment to prevent a competitor from
98. Gleick, supra note 72, at 88.
In 1991, Mike Maples, a senior Microsoft executive, described the company's
goals in the aggressive style that its top executives use to favor: If someone
thinks we're not after Lotus and after WordPerfect and after Borland, they're
confused.... My job is to get a fair share of the software applications market,
and to me that's 100 percent.
Id.
99. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9,40 (D.D.C. 1999).
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gaining an installed base according to the data in Losers.1°°
Microsoft's advantage came from leveraging the operating system and
impairing the ability of the most important competitor to ship its
product. Microsoft executives certainly thought that the leverage was
helping. When a senior Microsoft executive argued for leveraging the
operating system more to win the browser wars, he pointed to the
Office market as an example of how leverage works.
Let's [suppose] IE is as good as Navigator/Communicator. Who
wins? The one with 80% market share. Maybe being free helps us,
but once people are used to a product it is hard to change them.
Consider Office. We are more expensive today and we're still
winning. My conclusion is that we must leverage Windows more.
Treating IE as just an add-on to Windows which is cross-platform
[means] losing our biggest advantage-Windows market share. We
should dedicate a cross group team to come up with ways to
leverage Windows technically more ....

We should think about an

integrated solution-that is our strength.' 0 '

(3) The OperatingSystem: DR-DOS and NewWave

In presenting Microsoft's history of leadership, its defenders try
to invoke its track record of innovation in its defense, yet that history
can be used to prove exactly the opposite. In fact, if we go back to
the late 1980s and early 1990s, we find that the "other factors" were at
least as prominent as they were in the Browser case. 1°2 The claim that
Microsoft gained its advantage by being a leader on the quality side is
pursuit of imitation combined with anticontradicted by its vigorous
03
1
practices.
competitive
The elimination of the last significant competing operating
system from the Intel-based PC market is central to understanding
how leverage was used at this crucial time in the software market.
The victory over DR-DOS did not rest on a quality advantage. 1 4

100. LIEBOWrrz & MARGOLIS, LOSERS, supra note 12, at 146-47.

101. Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 51.
102. See LIEBOWITZ & MARGOLIS, LOSERS, supra note 12, at 150-157.
103. EDSTROM & ELLER, supra note 63, at 207; Gleick, supra note 72, at 82; David B.
Yoffie, CHESS and Competing in the Age of Digital Convergence, in COMPETING IN THE
AGE OF DIGITAL CONVERGENCE 27 (Harvard Business School ed., 1997).
104. Sheremata, Barriersto Innovation,supra note 74, at 942.
At the time DR-DOS 5.0 received much critical acclaim as the superior
product. However 1 month after DRI introduced DR-DOS 5.0, Microsoft
preannounced a similar set of features for MS-DOS. Although Microsoft did not
ship these features until over 1 year later, by 1993 market share for DR-DOS had
fallen to 3%. MS-DOS share rose to 79%.
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Rather, Microsoft imposed contract conditions on suppliers that
foreclosed and deterred competition. The early use of contracts to
secure the operating system monopoly against its rival, DR-DOS, is
central to Microsoft's dominance in the 1990s.
By 1991 account managers would read the terms of the licensing
policy in their OEM manuals in brief form. The new licensing
terms had started in the Far East, when low-cost clone vendors
were happy to increase their slim profit margins by using a cheaper
but better version of DOS-from DRI.
Microsoft had
implemented what eventually became known as "per processor"
licenses, which effectively locked computer makers into contracts
that required them to pay for the Microsoft operating system on
05
every computer.

Moreover, at the same time Microsoft was leveraging DR-DOS
out of the market, it was leveraging competing desktop applications
out of the market. 10 6 As with the browser, these earlier cases of

leveraging involved more than just shutting down distribution
channels. The full range of technical and economic weapons were

However, MS-DOS technology was based on CP/M which was an earlier
version of DR-DOS. This lends credence to reports that DR-DOS was the
product with superior quality. Apparently, Microsoft successfully applied its
monopoly power to forestall competitive innovation.

Id.
105. ROHM, supra note 63, at 41.
106. Id. at 71, 77, 78.
Gates, Lieven, Huels, and Reichel now discussed, among other things, an
agreement "to get DRI/Novell out of Vobis," a strategic partnership between the
two companies, and a commitment that Vobis would agree to sell "no Novell
NetWare Lite" but instead would contract for 25,000 copies of Windows for
Workgroups-a new product for Microsoft in the market for computer networks
in which it had no presence....
Among the e-mail messages not produced to the feds from the computers of
Microsoft Germany was one that Bernard Vergnes sent to a number of other
Microsoft executives on September 7, 1992. Along with documenting the Vobis
deal, it showed Microsoft's intent to use its DOS contracts to leverage computer
makers into buying Microsoft applications software in place of that from Lotus
and others....
In April 1991, Ballmer and Lieven had met in Nice. Ballmer had discussed
other "inducements," as Lieven would testify, involving bundling Microsoft
applications software with an operating system deal. A Microsoft Word/Excel
combination was suggested as part of the DOS/Windows deal....
After noting the success of Gates' meeting with Lieven, and the strong market
presence of Vobis-number one in market share, over IBM-the memo said:
Lieven... is willing to no longer offer DRI-DOS or Network Lied [sic] ... As
you know, Lotus and Borland have been aggressively approaching our OEMs,
and Vobis is no exception.
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used to drive competing software from the market and to undermine
its attractiveness to consumers. Microsoft leveraged the operating
system by creating incompatibilities.
OLE, per se, wouldn't make its debut in Windows until 1992. It
was heavily criticized for making the overall Windows system fat
and bloated. OLE consumed memory, process cycles, and not
surprisingly, was difficult for developers to support. Applications
compatibility introduced a whole other set of constraints on
applications developers. But that was exactly what it was designed
to do. As Eller argued, OLE was supposed to be fat and bloated.
Integration was all about making monolithic applications slowly
trade components among each other.
OLE was designed to protect developers of big applications who
were afraid of being scooped by slick applets, little applications
being crafted by much smaller development companies.
Microsoft didn't want a lot of other companies writing code that
could compete. It wanted to keep barriers to entry very high. The
idea, in fact, was to keep raising the bar, putting in more layers of
software and APIs, which developers would then have to support.
Microsoft wanted to make it so gnarly that anybody who couldn't
to every Windows
devote a team of one hundred programmers
07
application would be out of the game.'
From the outset, the process of building incompatibilities was
driven by preservation of the monopoly on the operating system. In
the early 1990s, Microsoft was already attacking "middleware" to
ensure its dominance in the applications market.
Established partly to promote code and resource sharing between
Microsoft's Word and Excel Application groups, Whitten's team
was also a reaction to a new software product from Hewlett
Packard called NewWave.
NewWave ran on top of Windows 2.03 and was part of HP's
glowing vision of how the office of the future would work:
orchestrated information sharing among different applications.
If HP were successful, it could end up owning the application
programming interfaces, or APIs, dictating how applications would
run on a PC. If HP succeeded, instead of writing to Microsoft's
Windows APIs, developers might write to HP's. This was an
immediate threat.
Nathan Myhrvold wrote of Microsoft's need to control API's in
order to maintain its stranglehold on the operating systems
business:
107.

EDSTROM & ELLER, supranote

63, at 117.
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The relationship of an application to the system API is similar
to the relationship that the roots of a tree have with the
ground-it is very complicated and makes it difficult for third
parties to clone. This helps prevent competitors from
dislodging a successful operating system. Evolution and
innovation provide another barrier as well as upgrade revenue.
The system must evolve its APIs and implementation over
time in order to remain successful. This gives ISVs more
features to exploit, makes it more difficult to clone, and it gives
users a reason to pay for an upgrade.
The applications architecture group sprang forth immediately, and
10 8
from it sprang object linking and embedding (OLE).
Cross subsidies from operating system profits undermined the
financial resources of competitors.
WordPerfect's profits were further eroded in the early 1990s by the
software price wars, which were part of Microsoft's strategy to keep
prices low in order to establish market share. Microsoft could
afford the razor thin margins that resulted because it had a steady
revenue stream from DOS and Windows. Other companies, like
Borland and WordPerfect, did not....
"Gates wanted this business so badly that he was willing to give it
[Microsoft Office] away for a while," said Kahn. "Because of his
position in operating systems, he had no problems doing that
because Microsoft was making so much money. Bill was buying
market share andkicking everybody else from the market." 109
Since Microsoft always used these anti-competitive "other
factors" while it improved its product, it is simply impossible to
conclude, as Schmalensee and Losers do, that quality won out.
IV. Market Performance: Consumer Harm
There are two readily identifiable areas of consumer harm in the
court's findings-qualitative harm to consumers and monetary
harm." 0 The court focused on issues of quality and innovation,
although it did note pricing abuse."' A precise quantitative estimate
of monetary harm was not a focal point in the courtroom because
there could be no monetary penalty in this case. Identifying the
pricing practices that indicated abuse, and the various anticompetitive uses to which the ill-gotten gains have been put, was

108. Id. at 113-14.
109. WALLACE, supra note 78, at 162-65.
110. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 30,110-12 (D.D.C. 2000).
111. Id. at 57-66.
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Microsoft and its defenders have attempted to
sufficient.
2
misrepresent this as a failure to show consumer harm."
This chapter focuses on the issue of direct monetary harm and
the exercise of monopoly power over price. It then briefly reviews
the qualitative and indirect forms of harm imposed on the public by
Microsoft's abuse of market power.
A. Microsoft's Pricing Strategy
One of the most critical areas of conduct and performance
analysis is pricing practices. The court was closely cognizant of
Microsoft's internal pricing analysis as an indicator of monopoly
pricing, concluding that
Microsoft's actual pricing behavior is consistent with the
proposition that the firm enjoys monopoly power in the market for
Intel-compatible PC operating systems. The company's decision
not to consider the prices of other vendors' Intel-compatible PC
operating systems when setting the price of Windows 98, for
example, is probative of monopoly power. One would expect a
firm in a competitive market to pay much closer attention to the
prices charged by other firms in the market....
[I]t is indicative of monopoly power that Microsoft felt that it had
substantial discretion in setting the price of its Windows 98 upgrade
product (the operating system product it sells to existing users of
Windows 95).
Furthermore, Microsoft expends a significant portion of its
monopoly power, which could otherwise be spent maximizing price,
on imposing burdensome restrictions on its customers-and in
inducing them to behave in ways-that augment and prolong that
monopoly power. For example, Microsoft attaches to a Windows
license conditions that restrict the ability of OEMs to promote
software that Microsoft believes could weaken the applications
barrier to entry. Microsoft also charges a lower price to OEMs who
agree to ensure that all of their Windows machines are powerful
enough to run Windows NT for Workstations. To the extent this
provision induces OEMs to concentrate their efforts on the
development of relatively powerful, expensive PCs, it makes OEMs
less likely to pursue simultaneously the opposite path of developing
for Microsoft's
"thin client" systems, which could threaten demand
3
Intel-compatible PC operating system products."
112. See Stan J. Liebowitz, An Expensive Pig in a Poke: Estimating the Cost of the
District Court's Proposed Breakup of Microsoft, ASS'N FOR COMPETITIVE TECH., Sept.
21,2000 [hereinafter Liebowitz, An Expensive Pig].
113. Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 26-28.
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Knowing that its pricing is not being driven by competition on
the supply-side, but solely by what the market will bear on the
demand side, the fundamental problem that Microsoft sees in the
market is not competing operating systems, but a low cost PC. Since
there is no supply-side pressure to lower prices, Microsoft's
fundamental problem is that as the total cost of the PC declines, its
high prices become a problem.
We expect <1 k PCs [PCs priced below $1,000] will be bought by
consumers and business and could constitute more than 50% of all
PCs by C-mass of 1998. In case we see $500 PCs next C-mass our
royalties could be as high as 10% of total system prices and if the
biz PC markets gets eroded by < 1k PCs we will with an NTW [NT
Workstation; now called Windows 2000] solution be in the same
4
position."
Ultimately, the low-end computer is the flash point for resistance
to Microsoft's pricing strategy. Microsoft recognizes that its prices
make it difficult for OEMs to compete on price.
We have shown larger than 40% growth rates annually and expect
in the future that OEMs will take a very hard look in how to avoid
paying us more $$ per system in order to hit most aggressive price
points." 5
The centerpiece of Microsoft's pricing strategy has been to
increase operating system prices while other components of the
delivered PC bundle have been falling.
While we have increased our prices over the last 10 years other
116
component prices have come down and continue to come down.
The second memorandum, which explicitly estimates the price of
operating systems, confirms this analysis. The average preinstalled
price is given as $19 in 1990 and over $49 in 1996.117 During that time
span the average Microsoft revenue for preinstalled software rose
from $25 to $62.118
Microsoft recognizes that it has been the beneficiary of volume
growth created by the falling price of the PC, which masks its
increasing prices.
Microsoft's increasing average sales price,
114. Government Exhibit #365: Memorandum from Joachim Kempin to Bill Gates,
dated Dec. 16, 1997, United States v. Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 1999) (Nos. CIV.
A. 98-1232, 98-1233).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Government Exhibit #439: PC Value Analysis Cy 1990 - Cy 1996, Mar. 4, 1996,
United States v. Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 1999) (Nos. CIV. A. 98-1232, 981233).
118. Id.
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combined with increasing sales volume, has fueled its rapid revenue
growth.
OEM division revenue growth over the last 8 years has depended
heavily on volume increases and a trend to higher priced OS
[Operating Systems]. During that time ASPs [average sales price]
made it easier to ride the
have stayed stable or have gone up which
9
wave and get the value we deserve."

Thus, one of the key elements in Microsoft's business model is to
bury its products in bundles. This hides the price from the public and
allows Microsoft to hide behind the declining price of the total

package. 120 Microsoft is committed to an operating system with a
price of at least $100 and will not contemplate price cuts on the
current operating system. Where Microsoft had not yet locked in

prices, it would not break the pricing strategy.' 2' To implement this
pricing strategy, Microsoft helps stimulate shipments of high-end
units. Its primary goal is to keep prices high and direct the market to

high-end units and high-end Microsoft products with sustainable
margins. Microsoft is determined to do everything it can to prevent
the market from centering on the low-priced computer. It will not

drop its price on operating systems and it intends to push it up. It will
119. Government Exhibit #365: Memorandum from Joachim Kempin to Bill Gates,
dated Dec. 16,1997, United States v. Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 1999) (Nos. CIV.
A. 98-1232, 98-1233).
120. Steady Pricing on Operating System Gives Microsoft Healthy Profit Window,
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, at E-11.

A paradox of technology is that as product performance goes up, price comes
down. Except, that is, in the world of Microsoft Corp.'s Windows operating
system. Everywhere else in the computer business, from chips to disk drives,
entertainment software, to routers, prices have fallen-often sharply-as
companies compete fiercely for market share.
Competitor and industry analysts figure that Windows 95 sells for about $45
per copy to computer makers who buy in quantity. That is the same price or
slightly more than the price of its processor....
Compare that with what has happened to the price of an Intel chip. Intel, like
Microsoft, is the leader in its market. But, Intel has tougher competition which
has been driving down chip prices.
Intel introduced its first Pentium processor in 1993. It has a speed of 60
megahertz, contained 3.1 million transistors and sold for $877 in quantities of
1,000. The Pentium II chip came out in 1997, running at 233 megahertz speed
and with 7.5 million transistors, the electronic switches that serve as the building
blocks for chips. Pentiums sold for $636 for 1,000 chip blocks are its May
introduction. Now the price is $236.
Id.
121. Government Exhibit #365: Memorandum from Joachim Kempin to Bill Gates,
dated Dec. 16, 1997, United States v. Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 1999) (Nos. CIV.
A. 98-1232, 98-1233) ("The answer here has to be 'no' for all people involved.").
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offer incentives to OEMs to hold the line, while it seeks to build up
the high end of the market. To the extent it has to, it will segment
institutional markets, like academia and government, and impose
strict pricing discipline. Microsoft will support expansion of the
availability of PCs only at the higher end.
While Microsoft recognizes that declining PC prices have
become a problem, it identifies a number of factors and strategies that
will enable it to double its prices. 122 Microsoft expects that 80 million
consumers will be forced to buy new computers to support its new
operating systems and that a shorter PC life will also fuel consumer
purchases of new systems.123 It hopes that increasing volume will
alleviate the pressures that OEMs are placing on its prices. Microsoft
hopes that growing availability of stripped down computers will
relieve some of the pressures to lower operating system prices. As
the core of the computer becomes cheaper, the demand-side
pressures will ease, which will give Microsoft the ability to keep its
prices high.
When comparing system prices over the last couple of years with
today's prices we should note that in the low end segment PC
manufacturers have started pulling out monitors and other items
from their systems. As a result my comparisons is not 100%
correct-but this does not change the trend. We have to assume
that not all of the <1k PCs will be less powerful or just consumer
focused. Many will be less capable as OEMs strip peripherals. We
are making this easy with USB, 1394, device bay etc. Easy transfer

of peripherals to new PCs could be the result and the vanilla core
architecture might get artificially even cheaper. At least this would

make it easier for us to defend our pricing as we increase our BOM
4
percentage.

12

This description of market dynamics reveals a great deal about
Microsoft's view of the low end of the market. Note that Microsoft
acknowledges the stripped down computer to be "consumer focused."
It considers the plain vanilla core to be "artificially cheap." Supplyside pressures are forcing OEMs to cut their prices and accept only

competitive returns. This is not how Microsoft behaves. Because it
does not face such pressure it sees declining costs for other
components as a chance to maintain and increase its own prices.
Above all, it is determined to resist attempts to force it to lower its
price.
122. Id.
123. Id.

124. Id.
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It considers changes in the structure (not level) of pricing to
protect its revenue. Price discrimination by computer system type is
rejected because Microsoft loses control.125 Product differentiation by
reducing the value of the basic operating system and then selling
additional packages is more attractive.
This is a viable option if we can make the add-on pack a stunning
piece of technology and a "must have" for every PC owner.
Performance, management and ease of use features come into my
to start on this now in order to be ready at
mind. Again we need
26
NT 6.0 time frame.
This passage from Microsoft's memo is remarkable on two
counts. First, it is particularly ironic to consider that in order to
defend its pricing strategy Microsoft considers breaking apart the
operating system bundle, which it otherwise claims must be kept
together to preserve a uniform experience. In three sentences,
Microsoft has debunked the essence of its defense to the unlawful
tying allegation in the antitrust case. Second, this quotation illustrates
that Microsoft's all consuming objective is keeping prices high at
consumers' expense.
In fact, the whole argument of pulling out peripherals, shrinking
down machines and reducing the preinstalled operating system
content supports a fundamental consumer conclusion: the PC has
developed to the point where it can be customized to much more
effectively meet consumer needs. The PC is becoming commoditized.
The memo then offers the following observation on an important
factor that contradicts these forces for increased demand: Consumers
do not actually need to upgradetheir computers.
The only counter argument to make here is that current PC
technology is totally sufficient for most office tasks and consumer
desires and that any performance bottleneck is not in today's PCs
but in today's COM [communications] pipes. This in itself might
slow down replacement cycles and life time shortening until we find

125. Id.
Both methods are an administrative nightmare for the OEMs and us. This
worked when we had only 3 CPU types and the one with the higher royalty had a
long cycle time-today we have too many types (I can just hear Intel calling me
feeling we treat them unfairly by putting all their competitors into the low end
bucket) and the cycle times are so unpredictable that we recommend against this.
We have priced once on manufacturer cost and it is a sure way to totally erode
your model without having any control. We rejected this as well.
Id

126. Id.
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true MIPS 4[millions of instructions per second] eating
1 27
applications-a priority not only INTEL should subscribe to.
Microsoft's problem is simple. Consumers do not need high-end
operating systems and the expensive machines necessary to run them.
Low-cost PCs will expand the market, but will not support Microsoft's
goals for revenue growth. Microsoft's answer is to render the existing
base and new low-cost machines obsolete so it can sell high-end
products at a greater margin.
B. Pricing Patterns
The harm to consumers resulting from Microsoft's anticompetitive and abusive business practices is most clearly evidenced
in the terms and prices at which Microsoft sells operating systems to
original equipment manufactures (OEMs). These terms and prices
establish the baseline for how much consumers ultimately pay.
Microsoft and its defenders claim that the price has been low and
stable over the 1990S.128 Some of its defenders go so far as to claim
that the price of the operating system has fallen. 129 However, two
internal Microsoft memoranda on the pricing of operating systems
130
flatly contradict these claims.
Historic pricing and strategic pricing plans demonstrate that
operating system prices increased dramatically in the 1990s after
Microsoft gained monopoly control over the operating system market
(see Exhibit IV-1). This reversed strong trends established during the
1980s towards declining prices and improving quality.
The internal Microsoft analysis shows that the price of the
operating system increased by almost 160% between 1990 and 1996.
That is an annual increase of 17%. In contrast, between 1981, when
the operating system was introduced, and 1990, when the last
significant competitor was driven from the PC operating system

127. Id.
128. See LIEBOWITZ & MARGOLIS, LOSERS, supra note 12, at 154-57.
129. See Stan J. Liebowitz, A Defective Product: Consumer Groups' Study of Microsoft
Pricing in Need of Recall, COMPETITIVE, ENTERPRISE INSTITUTION, Feb. 9, 1999, at

http://www.cei.org/OnPointReader.asp?ID=603. Liebowitz analyzes the street price, not
the preloaded prices of DOS/Windows, although the vast majority of operating system
sales that Microsoft makes are made preloaded. Id.
130. Government Exhibit #365: Memorandum from Joachim Kempin to Bill Gates,
dated Dec. 16, 1997, United States v. Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 1999) (Nos. CIV.
A. 98-1232, 98-1233); Government Exhibit #439: PC Value Analysis Cy 1990 - Cy 1996,
Mar. 4,1996, United States v. Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 1999) (Nos. CIV. A. 981232, 98-1233).
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market, the price of the operating system fell from $40 to $19.131 That
is an annual decline of 8% per year.
Not only are the claims of stable, low, and falling prices
contradicted by the analysis of preloaded, wholesale prices, but retail
price data presented by some Microsoft experts show that the street
price has increased as well.132 Elzinga and Mills, who cite a publicly
available and consistent source for their data, show a 30% increase1 33in
the street price of the operating system-Windows including DOS.
Microsoft and its defenders point to quality improvements as
justification for the dramatic price increases of the 1990s.134 Yet, the
1980s witnessed dramatic improvements in quality and prices fell
nonetheless. Because of economies of scale achieved from expanding
production and advances in software engineering, a competitive
software market produced dramatic increases in quality and
dramatically declining prices. It is the monopoly, not quality
improvements, that produced rising prices in the 1990s.
This pricing also contradicts other important claims by
Losers makes sweeping
Microsoft's defenders about pricing.
comparisons between prices in the early and mid-1980s and prices in
the mid to late 1990s. It claims dramatically declining prices in those
markets where Microsoft offers a product.135 The analysis never
considers the price of the operating system. Nor are concerns about
pricing limited to operating systems. Using the leverage of the
operating system monopoly, Microsoft went after the word processing
and spreadsheet markets. Using similar tactics as are being litigated
in the web browser case-bundling and impairing the ability of
competitors to work with Windows-Microsoft captured market
share equaling its operating system monopoly. A senior executive of
Microsoft, pointing to the successful bundling strategy in the desktop
market as a model for the browser wars, observed that Office is
136
expensive.
When this statement was made, prices were actually declining (a
fact that Microsoft defenders harp on), yet this executive knew the
131. Evans et al., supranote 11.
132. Leibowitz, supra note 129, at 2. Liebowitz claims an 18% price reduction for
Windows from 1990 to 1998 based on unavailable proprietary sources. Id.
133. Elzinga & Mills, supranote 11, at 51.
134. See Report of Direct Testimony of Richard Schmalensee, United States v.
Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 1999) (Nos. CIV. A. 98-1232, 98-1233); see also
Leibowitz, supra note 129, at 2. Both Schmalensee and Liebowitz mention the investment
in quality improvement.
135. LIEBOWITZ & MARGOLIS, LOSERS, supranote 12,156-57.

136. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 30,41 (D.D.C. 2000).
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product was expensive. The explanation is well known. Two massive
changes took place in the software market during this period to
dramatically lower costs that cannot be attributed to Microsoft. First,
marketing of software shifted from retail sales to wholesale

(preinstallation), which dramatically reduced distribution costs.
Second, the quantities of PCs shipped increased from a few million
per year to well over a hundred million, which dramatically lowered
average costs.

Moreover, as we have seen, Microsoft prevented

competing programs from being pre-installed.
While there are new functions in Windows, the unit costs are spread
over unit volumes that have increased dramatically, and that
continue to increase perhaps 25 percent per year. Microsoft's
average costs in marketing, distribution, and sales have also
declined sharply. The steady increase in its unit volumes, the
conversion from floppy discs to inexpensive CD-ROMs, and the
shift toward PC preloading, Interet-based distribution, and highvolume corporate licensing agreements have all been driving down
unit costs and driving up margins, for both Windows and Office. In
fact, Microsoft profits have consistently increased much faster than
1 37
its revenue over the last decade.

Microsoft enjoyed the benefits of these cost reductions, but
because it did not face sufficient competition, it did not pass the cost
reduction through to the public. That is the sense in which it was
expensive. Microsoft is actually a high-priced seller, compared to its
costs, not a low-priced one. To use Microsoft's own phrase uncovered
in evidence at the trial, it "rides the wave" of increasing sales of PCs

and declining PC prices to keep its prices high. By comparing old
apples to new oranges, the analysis presented by Microsoft's
defenders has reached the wrong conclusion about Microsoft's impact
138
in the market.

137. CHARLES H. FERGUSON, HIGH ST@KES No PRISONERS: A WINNER'S TALE OF
GREED AND GLORY IN THE INTERNET WARS 309 (Three Rivers Press ed., 1999).

138. LIEBOWITZ & MARGOLIS, LOSERS, supra note 12, at 154-57. Other price analyses
in Losers are also flawed. The price of software categories in which Microsoft does not
compete did not go down because there were high end, niche markets which were not
subject to the economic forces we have identified in the mass, desktop market. These
highly specialized programs are not amenable to pre-installation, since they are so
specialized. They do not exhibit the large economies of scale because they are not mass
market items.
The prices of applications that compete with Windows go down because Microsoft
has bundled these with the operating system. This category is made up of utilities and
communications applications, which Microsoft does not sell on a stand-alone basis. We
could argue that the increase in the price of the operating system (150% over the period)
was caused in part by this bundling.
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It appears that Microsoft is selling suites in the range of $125 to
$190 preloaded. The competitors sell suites at less than $15
preinstalled139 The premium is well over $100 and appears to have
gotten larger, primarily because the competitors have dropped their
price in an effort to stem the loss of market share.14°
C. Estimates of Monopoly Abuse

it
We are concerned about market power because of the harm 141
does to consumers by increasing prices above competitive levels.
Antitrust practice considers even fairly small pricing abuse-as low as
5%-to be a source of concern if the aggregate amount of abuse is
43
large. 42 Expert witnesses for Microsoft (Richard Schmalensee' )
Losers argues that Microsoft should have charged more for Word for the Mac when it
had a larger market share. This fails to consider key market factors that we have pointed
out. It can be argued that Microsoft charged the maximum that the market will bear as
determined by the market power of other component manufacturers and the elasticity of
demand. In the Mac market, Mac itself has much greater market power than Microsoft
and the elasticity of demand is too high.
139. Joel Brinkley, Microsoft Has a Stronghold in Office Suites, N.Y. TIMES, May 27,

1998, at D1-2.
They can buy individual copies of the program for installation on some
computers at a price of roughly $170 to $190. Or, they can buy the program at a
far lower price, roughly $125, if they purchase it for installation on every
computer in a company line....
As it is, Corel has changed its marketing strategy. "It's clear to us that
Microsoft isn't our competition anymore," he said. "They are our environment,
and we need to deal with that fact by making our product completely compatible
with Microsoft Office so users can move files back and forth between their
programs and ours.
Id.

140. A review from a November 1996 PC Magazine noted the very attractive
price/quality offer being made by Microsoft's competitors. PC Magazine wrote the
following:
Microsoft's approximately 85 percent revenue share of the suite market has
had at least one side effect: Lotus and Corel seem willing to cut prices and offer
more just to grab your attention. In addition to the incredibly low upgrade price
for Corel's WordPerfect Suite, the huge number of applications in its Office
Professional will make you do a double take. And, with the SmartSuite
upgrade's very competitive price, Lotus is getting into the act, too. Both
companies seem to be reconciled to the role of "spoiler," forcing Microsoft to
drop prices or sacrifice market share.
In the ensuing two years, not only did Microsoft not match the price
challenge, but also it increased its market share.
PC MAG., Nov. 19, 1998, at 105 (comparing Microsoft Office with its two largest
competitors).
141. SCHERER & ROSS, supra note 15, at 70-71.
142. Roger D. Blair & Amanda Esquibel, Some Remarks on Monopoly Leverage,
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and the Government (Franklin Fisher' 44) devoted considerable
attention to the question of the monopoly price of operating systems.
An amicus brief by Litan and Noll took up the issue, as well.145
Robert Litan, Roger Noll, and William Nordhaus estimate that
Microsoft's return on invested capital and research and development
was 88% for the fiscal year ending 1999.
Over the period 1990-98, post-tax rate of profit of U.S corporations
averaged 6.7 percent per year. Using published numbers from
Microsoft's financial statements, we estimate that in 1999
Microsoft's post-tax rate of profit was 88 percent. In other words,
Microsoft's rate of profit on its investment is currently more than
thirteen times the average rate of profits of major U.S. corporations.
This is most impressive economic demonstration of the economic
returns6 to monopoly that we have ever seen in a major antitrust
14
case

The implications of this analysis are staggering. If Microsoft had
earned an average rate of return, its profit over the four year period,
1996-1999, would have been between $16 and $20 billion less.
Keeping in mind that this is after tax dollars, the implicit excess
charges to the public would be between $25 and $30 billion. This is a
huge sum of excess profits.

Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARV. L. REV. 937 (1981)) (giving an
example using 10%).
143. Report of Direct Testimony of Richard Schmalensee, United States v.
Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 1999) (Nos. CIV. A. 98-1232,98-1233).
144. Rebuttal Testimony of Franklin Fisher taken on June 1 and 2, 1999, United States
v. Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 1999) (Nos. CIV. A. 98-1232,98-1233).
145. Remedies Brief of Amici Curiae, United States v. Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d 9
(D.D.C. 1999) (Nos. CIV. A. 98-1232, 98-1233).
The liability phase of the case contained a discussion of profit margins. These
are not the appropriate concept for measuring monopoly profits. In competitive
markets, the profit rate on investments will tend to be the opportunity cost of
capital (with appropriate adjustments for differences in risk, inflation, and taxes).
If a monopoly earns supranormal profits, that will be seen its rate of profits.
The profit margin is equal to the rate of profit on investment times the ratio of
investments to sales. The investment-sales ratio is essentially a nuisance
parameter that confuses the calculation and has no particular relationship to the
exercise of market or monopoly power.
Therefore, in order to measure whether a monopolist has been successful in
earning monopoly profits, the appropriate analytical concept it the rate of return
on investment and not the profit margin.
Id.
146. Id. at 65.
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(1) Defining and Measuringthe Problem of Market Power over Price: The
Lerner Index
Market power allows a firm to set price above marginal cost and
achieve above-normal profits. 47 The Lerner index (L) measures the
mark-up above cost resulting from market power. 148 The Lerner
Index represents the ratio of the monopoly overcharge (P - MC)
divided by the total price (P).
L-

P-

MC
P

The total value of the overcharge is derived by multiplying the per
unit overcharge times the total number of units sold.
There are generally uncertainties about the cost data and, given
Microsoft's extreme secrecy about pricing, there is even debate about
price data, which is usually readily observable in the market.
Therefore, economists frequently consider several other measures of
monopoly profits that are the aggregate manifestation or the result of
the underlying pricing abuse.
A good long-run approximation to the Lerner index is the ratio of
supra-normal profits to normal cost. This is approximated by the
ratio:
Supra-normal profit
Sales revenue
where supra-normal profit = sales revenue-noncapital costsdepreciation-(total capital x competitive cost per unit of
149
capital).
The profit margin identified above is the abnormal profit margin
earned by the monopolist. While profit margins are readily available,
they present some problems.

147. SCHERER & Ross, supra note 15, at 70-71.

148. Id.
Its merit is that it reflects the allocatively inefficient departure of price from
marginal cost associated with monopoly. Under pure competition, M=0. The
more a firm's pricing departs from the competitive norm, the higher its
associated Lerner Index value. A related performance-oriented approach
focuses on some measure of the net profits realized by firms or industries
Id.
149. Id. at 415-16.
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Because the cost of capital is not recorded in firms' accounting
statements and can only be imputed with difficulty, few researchers
have developed accounting-based estimates of rs. Economists
seeking to avoid this difficulty have usually opted for second-best
surrogates falling into three categories.
One is the accounting rate of return on stockholders' equity:
Accounting profits to stockholders
Book value of stockholders equit3i
Or on capital:
=

c

Accounting profits + interest payments
Total Assets150

Litan, Noll, and Nordhaus use the latter measure and compare
Microsoft's performance to that of all nonfinancial corporations to
Estimates of
derive their estimates of astronomical profits.
profitability based on the prior two measures and applied to a set of

companies chosen to be more comparable support their conclusion.
(2) EmpiricalEstimates
Ideally, we would observe the price in the marketplace, estimate
the cost, and calculate the index directly. Obtaining data, however, is

always a problem. Historical price behavior indicates a direct
correlation between competition and lower prices (See Exhibit IV2). 151 Eliminating competition results in prices being higher than they
150. Id. at 416.
151. ROHM, supra note 63, at 85, 263-64.
DR-DOS had Gates going ballistic when it came out with DR-DOS 5.0 in
April 1990, and now only months later his sales team was locking computer
makers into contracts for Microsoft's version of the product, which it had
publicly stated would appear also in 1990 [It would not appear until June 1991]
Meanwhile, in e-mail after e-mail, Gates had complained to Ballmer that DRDOS had made it impossible for him to keep prices high. How could he continue
to be profitable with DR-DOS around?
A few weeks earlier Susman had deposed Gates while Palumbo had deposed
Brad Chase. Microsoft's counsel Steve Holly had been present. Susman had
confronted Gates with an e-mail message to Steve Ballmer in which Gates had
railed on about the fact that DR-DOS was cutting into his ability to keep prices
for MS-DOS high.
Rohm notes similar potential with respect to applications.
Gates then went on to itemize the key impacts of Novell's move on each area
of his business. His concern was how the merged company would impact
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should. Under a worst-case scenario from a consumer perspective,
the price of operating systems should have remained flat throughout
the 1990s. A modest, 3% decline in prices could have been expected.
We estimate a competitive price for operating systems in the range of
$15-$25. We observe a price in the range of $50 to $60. Monopoly
overcharges are in the range of $35-$45. Based on this estimate, the
operating system is marked-up between 100 and 200%.
To calculate the total overcharges, we multiply by the number of
units sold. With approximately 260 million units sold, and taking
taxes into account, we estimate overcharges in the range of $12.6 to
$16.2 billion. This is based on operating system sales only. The Litan
et al. estimate of $25 to $30 billion would include excess from other
lines of business, applications in particular.
For the purposes of estimating monopoly profits we consider five
categories of companies for comparison (see Exhibit IV-3): (1) the
entire computer industry; its three subgroups: (2) computer hardware
and peripherals, (3) computer software, (4) semiconductors; and (5)
all U.S. industry. In all comparisons, the non-Microsoft comparisons
exclude Microsoft and Intel. We look at the overall industry since
Microsoft has tried to claim that all elements of the computer industry
are potential competitors.
Microsoft's return on equity (ROE) is much higher than that of
companies in the comparison groups. It has had an ROE over 30%
for the past three years and has maintained close to a 30% ROE for a
decade. This return on equity is approximately twice as high as that
of the industry as a whole, almost twice that earned by other software
firms, and two to three times the national average.
Microsoft's profit margin is also extraordinarily high and has
increased in recent years. In 1999, Microsoft had a profit margin of
about 41%. This margin was about six times higher than those of the
software and services sector and the hardware sector, and

Microsoft Office, Microsoft's office productivity suite, fretting that Novell could
turn its own office suite into "a serious contender which could force price and
volume cuts in our office business."
Id at 183. "By 1994, after DR-DOS was pretty much dead, Microsoft had doubled the
price of DOS. There was no alternative on the market. Like a classic monopolist, once it
had eliminated competition, prices soared." Id. at 80; see also Amy Cortese, Windows:
What's the Real Cost, BUS. WK., Oct. 19, 1998, at 46; Neil Gandal, Hedonic Price Indexes
for Spreadsheetsand an Empirical Test for Network Externalities,25 RAND J. ECON. 160,
160-70 (1994); see generally Erik Brynjolfson, The Productivity Paradox, COMM. ASS'N
COMPUTING MACH., Dec. 1993.
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average. 152

national

These

extraordinary profit margins are attainable because the lack of
competition allows Microsoft to maintain high prices. As a result,
Microsoft pockets all of the benefits of economies of scale and scope.
These benefits are not passed on to the public. Total returns to
investors reflect these extremely high profit margins. Microsoft has
yielded a total return to investors almost three times the national
average in the decade prior to the antitrust case and 50% above the
industry average. 153 Based on the profitability analysis, we arrive at a
range of estimated overcharges of $10 to $20 billion.
(3) Elasticities

Because of the lack of cost data and concerns about price and
profit data, economists frequently transform the price/cost analyses
into other economic measures for which they have data or which they
can estimate. Economists on both sides of the case have used
estimates of demand elasticity to evaluate whether Microsoft has
abused its monopoly power. The price cost margin can be converted
to the reciprocal of the elasticity of elasticity of demand.
L

P-

MC

P

1
E

Microsoft experts, inside and outside of the courtroom, applied
two variants of this formula. Rather than calculate the mark-up
above cost, first they estimated the monopoly price that would be
charged, given the elasticity of demand.
152. The New Microsoft, FORTUNE, Feb. 14, 2000, at 90. A recent analysis in Fortune
makes the general point in this section in stark terms. It presented Microsoft's revenues

and profits broken down by divisions.
* The platforms group was attributed a profit margin of 90%. It included the
operating system and is the clearest case of monopoly power.
* The remainder of the company had a profit margin of about 17%.
* This is a widely held view of the profitability of the various lines of business.
The developer groups were defined as products and services for programmers, which
is clearly an area where Microsoft exercises market power since programmers are
dependent on access to the operating system. It had a profit margin of 30%. The business
applications group included desk top applications, where competition has been
dramatically reduced in recent years, and back office server software, where competition is
vigorous. It had a profit margin of 24%. The Consumer group (basically internet and
cable TV products) had a net loss of 20%. The abnormal profits in operating systems and
the more normal profits in other divisions reflects the market power being exercised by
Microsoft. Id.
153. See generally Fortune500, FORTUNE, Apr. 28,1998.
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P.=Cj E. -1
where:
P. = Price of the operating system charged to the OEM
Q, = Competitive price of computers
E = Price elasticity of computers
They then took a second approach in which they included
revenues from sales of complementary products, like office suites.
P0 = C,- R*E, / E, -1

where:
P0 = Price of the operating system charged to the OEM
C = Competitive price of computers

E, = Price elasticity of computers
R = Revenue from complementary products

Schmalensee estimates market power using the Lerner Index,
with and without complementary revenues (see Exhibit IV-4). He
assumes that, for 1997, Microsoft is a lone monopolist charging $50
per operating system. It faces demand elasticity of 2. It has
complementary net revenues from other software products sold for
each computer of $100 per computer. Computers cost $2,000. Under
these assumptions, he concludes that the profit-maximizing price for
the operating system would be $1750. Since Microsoft actually
charges only $50, Schmalensee asks, "Why Does Microsoft Charge So
Little for Windows?" He concludes that the explanation is that
154
Microsoft is not abusing its monopoly power.
Fisher assumes the following for 1999. Microsoft is a lone
monopolist charging $65 per operating system. It faces demand
elasticity of 4. It has complementary net revenues from other
software products sold for each computer of $160 per computer.
Computers cost $1,000. Under these assumptions he concludes that
the profit-maximizing price for the operating system would be about
$100. Since Microsoft actually charges $65, Fisher shows that
Microsoft is capturing a large part of the monopoly rents.155 Fisher's
analysis is much more compelling, conceptually and empirically.
First, as he notes, the antitrust issue is not whether the
monopolist maximizes its profits at any moment in time, but whether

154. Report of Direct Testimony of Richard Schmalensee, United States v. Microsoft
Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 1999) (Nos. CIV. A. 98-1232, 98-1233).
155. Rebuttal Testimony of Franklin Fisher taken on June 1 and 2, 1999, United States
v. Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 1999) (Nos. CIV. A. 98-1232, 98-1233).
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it abuses its market power.15 6 The court notes that Microsoft engaged
in behavior to increase both short term and long term monopoly
power. 157 The antitrust issue is whether the monopolist raises prices
sufficiently above the competitive level to impose significant harm on
58
the public.
Second, a close look at the empirical evidence in the case,
particularly Microsoft's own internal pricing strategy memoranda,
shows that Fisher's analysis is much better supported by the facts.
The empirical data in a Microsoft pricing memo shows linear price
elasticity of about 4.159 That is, a 1% decline in the price of computers
was associated with a 4% increase in sales of preloaded operating
systems. This is much larger than the highest level assumed by
Schmalensee in his analysis. 160 Microsoft's complementary revenue
per preloaded operating system is $5 for every $1 of preloaded
revenue. 161 Its gross profit margin (pretax) is about 60%.162
Therefore, its complementary net revenue is closer to $150 than $100.
The evidence at the trial suggests that another consideration
must be added-a consideration that Microsoft takes into account in
its own pricing strategy-the behavior of Intel. Intel is a "partner"-

156. Id.
157. Id
158. Blair & Esquibel, supra note 142, at 392.
159. PC Value Analysis shows in the monopoly period-1991 to 1996-an elasticity of
4.55. More recent years show higher elasticities. Including 1990 lowers the price elasticity
to 3.1. While it may be preferable to calculate elasticities based on more sophisticated
data and models, this basic data is before the court as evidence. Government Exhibit
#439: PC Value Analysis Cy 1990 - Cy 1996, Mar. 4, 1996, United States v. Microsoft, 84
F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 1999) (Nos. CIV. A. 98-1232,98-1233).
160. Report of Direct Testimony of Richard Schmalensee, United States v. Microsoft
Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 1999) (Nos. CIV. A. 98-1232, 98-1233). Schmalensee's
assumption that the elasticity of demand for PCs represents the elasticity of demand for an
intermediate component, such as the operating system, which is a small, but growing part
of the total price, can be debated, as well. For the purposes of rebuttal Fisher accepted the
assumption, as does this analysis.
161. Government Exhibit #439: PC Value Analysis Cy 1990 - Cy 1996, Mar. 4, 1996,
United States v. Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 1999) (Nos. CIV. A. 98-1232, 981233). The Value Memo shows that in 1996 Microsoft sold approximately 50 million
preloaded units at approximately $50 per unit, for total revenue of $2.5 billion. Its 1996
total revenues were $15 billion. Thus, it earned $5 of other revenue for each $1 of
preloaded revenues.
162. Reddy et al., supra note 11, at 11-12. Reddy et al. assume net revenues are 67% of
sales. This is a higher margin than observed in the data although it could be justified by
arguing that complementary sales have lower marginal costs than the overall operations of
the company. Because we have treated all revenues as complementary, it is more
appropriate to use the company-wide net profit margin.
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a joint monopolist-with Microsoft. 163 Microsoft compares its share
in the total PC price to that of Intel. It worries about Intel trying to
capture its margins and plots how to defend them. As Kempin noted,
the operating system software and the CPU are intertwined, just as
Microsoft and Intel are intertwined. 164
Microsoft notes that Intel's pricing power has declined as a result
of competition from other chip manufacturers, while Microsoft's
pricing power in the operating system market has not.165 Microsoft
identifies two market segments in the chip market-a high priced
segment and a low priced segment. Microsoft documents show that in
a price of $286 per
1996 the joint monopolists were charging
66
computer for their combined products.
If we plug these observations into the formula used by
Schmalensee and Fisher (as in Exhibit IV-4), we find that Microsoft
has, in fact, charged prices that capture the vast majority of the
monopoly rents available. In 1996, it was capturing over threequarters of these profits, and today it is capturing virtually all of them
This analysis also explains why Microsoft is so concerned about
the declining price of computers. As this price declines, Microsoft's
ability to defend and expand its margins is inhibited. The Kempin
Memo outlines Microsoft's strategy not only for keeping operating
system prices up, but also for doubling them over the next few years.
Microsoft's experts undertake another statistical analysis. 67
They attempt to show that Microsoft acts like it faces a high elasticity
of demand by deriving the market elasticity for the assumed pricing
behavior.168 Dividing the market price of the PC by the total revenue
assumed per computer yields a high elasticity of 13 ($2000/$150 = 13).
This is much higher than the observed market elasticity.
The assumptions derived from the Microsoft memos are much
more reasonable since they yield an estimated elasticity of 4.59

163. Government Exhibit #365: Memorandum from Joachim Kempin to Bill Gates,
dated Dec. 16, 1997, United States v. Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 1999) (Nos. CIV.
A. 98-1232, 98-1233).
164. Id165. Id.
166. Government Exhibit #439: PC Value Analysis Cy 1990 - Cy 1996, Mar. 4, 1996,
United States v. Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 1999) (Nos. CIV. A. 98-1232, 981233).
167. Reddy et al., supra note 11, at 3-4.
168. Id.
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($2000/[286+150] = 4.59).169 This is exactly the price elasticity
observed in the 1991-1996 data, the period of the monopoly. If a
price elasticity of 4.5 were used in the analysis summarized in Exhibit
IV-4, the estimated monopoly price would be $296. This indicates
that the Wintel monopoly is capturing 97% of the available economic
rents.
D. Business Case Evidence Before the Court on Monopoly Power and the
Benefits of Competition
The second pricing memorandum also provides insight into
nature of monopoly rents being collected and the powerful effect that
breaking a monopoly can have (see Exhibit IV-5). 70°
The
memorandum claims that Intel's CPU price increased over the 19901996 period. On a percentage basis, it did not increase as much as
Microsoft's, but the increases were substantial, just over 100%. If
competition were to break out, prices would tumble for both CPU
and OS.
In fact, Microsoft notes that competition has picked up in the
CPU market.
This is particularly true for CPU prices, where AMD and CYRIX
are clearly under $50/unit components with packaging COG [Cost
of Goods] of $20-$25. Intel has higher costs today because of their
packaging and I estimate that their current average CPU price is
around $170-$180 with $40-$60 in packaging costs (so the money
they are getting for their IP on silicon is $120-$140 in average,
which compared with NTW prices being between $100 and $120
typically). I am interested in listening to them when they explain to
71
us their low-end strategy in Dec.
In other words, competitors are bringing CPUs to market for less
than half of what Intel gets for its intellectual property (IP).
Microsoft has a target price of between $100 and $120 for its
operating software. Although Intel is having trouble defending its
monopoly rents in the face of cost cutting competition, the target for
Wintel is $270 for CPU+OS.

169. Government Exhibit #439: PC Value Analysis Cy 1990 - Cy 1996, Mar. 4, 1996,
United States v. Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 1999) (Nos. CIV. A. 98-1232, 981233).
170. Id.

171. Government Exhibit #365: Memorandum from Joachim Kempin to Bill Gates,
dated Dec. 16,1997, United States v. Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 1999) (Nos. CIV.
A. 98-1232,98-1233).
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Microsoft contemplates competition breaking out in one of two
ways. Intel could bolt OS onto its CPU, squeezing out the rents from
OS, but preserving its rents on CPU. Since Intel's costs were put in
the $170 to $180 range, the implicit cost of a start-up operating system
is in the range of $20 to $30. This is quite consistent with our
conclusion that the cost of Microsoft's ongoing operating system is in
the range of $15 to $25. If Intel were to take this strategy, it would
squeeze out Microsoft's rents and lower the price of CPU+OS by $70
to $100.
Alternatively, Microsoft could bundle CPU with its OS,
squeezing out CPU rents, but protecting its OS rents. Assuming the
startup costs about $70 to $75, as previously estimated by Microsoft, it
could bring the bundle to market at $170. This strategy would lower
the cost of CPU + OS by $100 to $125.
Competition is "ugly" to Microsoft, but if full component
competition were to break out across both the products, consumers
would achieve savings of almost $200. The resulting squeeze would
push the profits of both companies down to reasonable levels.
Implicitly, in this analysis, Microsoft's margins are about twice as
large as Intel's. If these rents were squeezed out, each of the firms
would see its profit margins reduced to just slightly over the average
for the rest of the computer industry.
E. Indirect Consumer Harm
There are a series of additional interrelated effects of the
Microsoft monopoly that must be considered in assessing the harm it
imposes on the public-severe negative effects on innovation in the
industry and indirect costs imposed on consumers.
Stifling Innovation by Chilling Investment in Products That
Might Compete with Microsoft's Core Products: The court noted
that the repeated pattern of anti-competitive actions has a chilling
effect on the companies that would enter the Intel-based PC market.
Delaying and Preventing the Development of Products: The
court noted at least six instances in which Microsoft sought to delay
the development of competing products. It noted several instances in
which it delayed the delivery of its own products to accomplish an
anti-competitive outcome.
Denying Consumers Alternatives That Would Better Suit Their
Needs: Microsoft imposed strict discipline on companies shipping
Windows to prevent them from altering the configuration of Windows
and related icons. The court was struck by the extent to which
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Microsoft was willing to inconvenience consumers to preserve its hold
on the market and the inconvenience created by Microsoft's steadfast
control of the boot screen. The court took special note of the fact
that the OEMs were the ones who actually dealt with the public and
they perceived a significant problem in Microsoft's refusal to allow
modification of the boot screen. The costs they perceived were
substantial.
Denying or Delaying the Introduction of Non-Microsoft
Products: By denying or delaying the introduction of non-Microsoft
products, Microsoft restricts consumer choice. These tactics were not
restricted to the browser. There was a broad range of products that
Microsoft slowed or prevented from getting to market.
Forcing Consumers to Buy Non-Microsoft Products in
Inconvenient Ways:
By foreclosing the primary channels of
distribution with exclusive contracts and other deals, Microsoft forces
consumers of non-Microsoft products to acquire them in timeconsuming and inconvenient ways.
Undermining Compatibility: There were also several instances in
which Microsoft undermined the ability of software applications or
middleware to function properly with the operating system.
Impairing the Functionality of Microsoft Products to Defend Its
Own Monopoly: Microsoft was quite willing to undermine the quality
of its own and of competing products to preserve its market
dominance.
Forced Upgrades and Additional Support Costs: With no
competition, Microsoft upgrades, which are sold to the public,
become extremely high margin products. 172 Microsoft is able to sell
excessive functionality. 173 Consumers pay for more functionalities
172. Steve Lohr, Where Microsoft Wants to Go Today, N.Y. TIMES, June 5,1998, at D-1
("David Rearderman, an analyst at Nationsbanc Montgomery Securities, estimates that
operating system revenues in 1997 were $4.6 billion and produced gross profit margins of
90 percent."); see also Denise Caruso, Nimbly, Microsoft Has Taken Advantage of
Ignorance to Reshape the World, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 1997, at D-4 ("In contrast to
product-development cycles in old-style manufacturing businesses, like automaking,
extensive changes to an operating system-and the subsequent upgrades they force
throughout the chain-require no costly retooling of assembly lines and no new raw
materials. The main cost is human capital-some months of programmers' time.").
173. See Caruso, supra note 172.
And Microsoft has taken brilliant advantage of that ignorance. Many people,
for example, do not understand how Microsoft's business works or how it has
come to dominate the software industry.
The key to Microsoft's success is its strategy of linking its Windows operating
systems-the foundation of a PC's operations-to its productivity applications, to
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bundled into packages of software than they should and they are
forced to buy bigger machines. 174 Because Microsoft does not face
competition, it is does not face pressures to provide high quality
products and the public is forced to purchase systems that are much
buggier than they should be.
Microsoft drives a rapid product cycle 75 with inefficient software
that requires bloated hardware. 176 Furgeson sums up linking the lack
the Internet, to its consumer products, to its programming tools and to hardware
manufactures in a tight, interdependent chain.
Whenever it makes a significant modification to Windows-as it did in the
step from Windows 3.1 to Windows 95, for example-everything in the chain has
to change, too....
Customers are caught in the competitive spiral, being constantly pressured to
upgrade "obsolete" software-though the definition of obsolescence is
debatable.
l
174. Gleick, supranote 72, at 83.
Anecdotally, it is clear that millions of high-end users have bought the
upgrade but that millions of corporate customers have chosen to delay the
inevitable heartache, particularly when most existing hardware lacks the speed
and memory to run it well. It does not matter. In the long run virtually every
desktop computer will run Windows 95 and its successors. New computers
shipping now have Windows 95 preinstalled by default. Applications developers
have either stopped developing for DOS and Windows 3.1 or soon will.
Id
175. FERGUSON, supranote 137, at 309-10.

Microsoft also uses another technique, the forced upgrade cycling of its
installed base, which increases its revenues but imposes huge costs on consumers
by forcing them to replace their hardware more frequently than necessary.
Clearly, the rapid progress of computer hardware technology helps ease the pain
of the high rate of obsolescence Microsoft creates, but there is considerable pain
nonetheless. The pace of updates and sheer number of new features results in
the often bug-ridden bloatware that consumers and businesses are forced into
accepting.
With each new round of updates, Microsoft generally discontinues or at least
deemphasizes sales and support for older versions.... The introduction of
backward incompatible new features, even if each feature is used by only a small
percentage of users, will quickly result in a high fraction of new documents being
unreadable by older versions of the application. The whole user base is therefore
forced into a kind of perpetual motion machine of rapid version updating....
This forced version cycle imposes enormous costs on users that are probably
beginning to approach, or even exceed, the size of the benefits discussed earlier.
First, users must buy new hardware more frequently. Even larger, however, are
the increased installation, service and maintenance costs imposed by this regime.
Id
176. Id at 310.
Since there is rapid technological progress in semiconductors, plus genuine
competition in the hardware sector, PC costs have been flat to falling. Recently,
direct and Internet retailing have further reduced manufacturing and distribution
costs to extraordinarily low levels. As a result Microsoft has been able to pursue
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of innovation with the distortion of the competitive process to
consumer harm.
Furthermore, too much Microsoft software is just bad. With some
justice, Microsoft can argue that it faces unique challenges-a huge
number of users running a very large number of slightly different
hardware platforms in an industry with an unusually high rate of
technical change.
But Cisco routers have most of those
characteristics, and they work much better. It is also noteworthy
how often freeware outperforms Microsoft's commercial
products....
Microsoft's position as the monopolist purveyor of mediocre
software is another source of large, and unnecessary, social costs.
Training and recovery from software errors and crashes are, along
with rapid version cycling, major contributors to service costs....
Conservative estimates are that the cost of maintaining a desktop is
several times higher than the cost of purchasing it. Cleaner,
simpler, better-designed software could reduce these overhead
costs, thereby freeing large numbers of technologists to do useful
77
work.
The generally accepted rule of thumb is that corporations spend
three to five times their hardware costs on service. New hardware
and software products must be installed, debugged and then
serviced; employees must be taught how to use them. These costs
increase greatly with the novelty and heterogeneity of systems in
use; hence the more upgrade cycling, the higher these costs.
Finally, there is Microsoft's effect upon potential and actual
innovation. It is abundantly clear that any new entrant who creates
a large market or a threat to Microsoft's monopoly platform
position will be the object of a brutally effective, often predatory
retaliation in which Microsoft will use every unfair advantage it
178
possesses.
Precise estimates of indirect costs such as these are always

difficult to make. Ferguson's discussion suggests that hundreds of
billions of dollars of consumer savings would result from a restoration
its strategy without causing unacceptable increases in hardware prices.
Nonetheless, even $599 PCs are probably $100 more expansive than they would
be if Microsoft wrote products more carefully and without artificial feature
increases. More important, people would not need to replace their computers as
frequently or spend as much money servicing them. These costs affect everyone,
but they probably affect poor people and the developing world more than the
average business user.
Id.
177. Id. at311.
178. Id.
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of competitive processes in the industry. The reduction in direct costs
resulting from the elimination of monopoly rents and excessive
hardware costs are actually the smallest part of the potential
savings.179 Far larger are a more rational product cycle,180 reduced
support costs associated with less frequent upgrades and reduced
instability 181 and reduced crash time.18 Although many of the savings
are indirect, they are substantial, nonetheless. 18 3 If one is assessing
the economic impact of the Microsoft monopoly on consumers, they
must be considered.
V. Antitrust Lessons for the Internet Century
A.

Competition in the New Economy and the Microsoft Remedy
The business case analysis in the previous section provides a

useful transition to lessons for antitrust analysis in high technology
179. Consider the following example calculation. Assume 100 million units shipped at
an average hardware cost of $750 and software costs of $250. Ferguson estimates bloated
hardware costs at $100 per PC. FERGUSON, supra note 137, at 310. Earlier, we had
identified software monopoly rents in the range of $80 to $125 per PC. Assume a total of
$200 savings per PC.
Currentcosts = $1,O00/PCx100 million PCs = $100 billion
Competitive costs =$800/PCx 100 million PCs = 80billion
Consumer Savings = 20 billion
180. Continuing the example above, assume a 25% reduction in the product cycle.
= $80 billion
Competitive costs = $800/PCx 100 million PCs
25% reductionin productcycle = $800/PCx 75 Million PCs = 60 billion
ConsumerSavings = 20 billion
181. Ferguson uses a rule of thumb of support costs, primarily associated with upgrades,
of 3 to 5 times the acquisition costs. ld at 311. Assume the mid-point of 4 times. Further
assume that support costs decline in proportion to the slowing of the upgrade cycle (25%).
= $400 billion
Support costs = 4 x $100 billion
25% reductionin supportequal cycle = 300 billion
Consumer Savings = 100 billion
182. Ferguson does not offer an estimate of the value of reduced crash time, he points
out that other products work much better. The value of savings would be immense. For
example, surveys show that consumers endure over 5 hours per month of down time due
to crashes. Even reducing this by two hours per month would be worth approximately
$100 billion dollars. ld at 311.
2 hr/monthx 12 x 300 million base = 72 billion hrs
Valuing each hour at $14 per hour Savings = $100 billion
183. Thus, one can quickly arrive at savings in the range of $200 billion per year, when
considering the impact of the Microsoft monopoly only on the operating system and the
hardware costs it is driving. The U.S. accounts for half this both because of computer
purchases and intensive use of computers. See U.S. DEP'T. OF COMMERCE, U.S. INDUS.
& TRADE OUTLOOK, ch. 27-28 (2000). For example, the U.S. accounts for just under half
of all computer systems and software purchases and almost 60% of all Internet traffic. See
id.
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industries. The "bundling/bolting" strategies represent competition
between layers of the dominant platform. That is, a firm that is
dominant in one layer (OS) can compete at another layer (CPU), but
does not lose control over the layer it dominates. It is forced to
squeeze out the rents from the other layer, but is satisfied with the
defense of rents in its own layer. The possibility of competition across
both layers exists. If full component competition were to break out,
about twice as much rent could be squeezed out.
This is, of course, what Netscape/Java threatened to do to
Microsoft. By attacking from the applications layer to the operating
system layer, they threatened to "commoditize" the operating system.
Commoditization is the consumers' best friend, since it drives the
rents out of the industry.
For proof that it is sustainable in high tech industries, we need
look no farther than to another layer of the platform, the hardware
layer. Microsoft's strategic analysis gives us a graphic picture of the
computer as a commodity, with constant price competition, pressures
on margins, rising quality and compatibility.
The Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Attorneys General
proposed, and the court adopted, a "functional" divestiture with a
three year transitional period of extensive conduct oversight. 184 They
propose to divide Microsoft into two roughly equal companies, each
owning different types of software. The Operating Company would
be built around the Windows operating system. The Applications
Company would be built around Office, the Internet Explorer
browser, and other applications. If the break-up is not ordered, the
plaintiffs recommend that the conduct oversight remain in place for
ten years. This approach is cautious, but appears to be a good
compromise.
Breaking up Microsoft would unleash powerful competitive
market forces in the industry and send a strong message that illegal
business practices will not be tolerated. The functional breakup
would not fragment the operating system. The transitional conduct
remedies are intended to give the new incentives a chance to take
root by re-igniting the competitive process in the industry. After a
short transition, there would be no regulation of either of the new
companies.
The remedy attacks the key element of market power that
Microsoft executives repeatedly identified and used in their business
184. Plaintiffs' Proposed Final Judgment, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp.
2d 30,44 (D.D.C. 2000) (Nos. CIV.A. 98-1232, 98-1233).
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plans and strategies to undermine competition. A functional
divestiture would restore the natural competitive process in the
software industry. Competition builds out from a strong customer
base in a complementary product. That is the competitive dynamic
that existed in the mid-1990s before Microsoft "cut off its air supply."
The DOJ remedy gave considerable weight to the layer concept.
The DOJ remedy does not create immediate, new competition within
either the operating system or the applications layer of the PC
market, but the government experts argue that it would restore the
competitive dynamics of the software market. 185 It would allow and
encourage competition across the two software layers. Therefore, it
would allow competition to grow in the way it was developing before
Microsoft's vigorous campaign to preserve its monopoly in the mid1990s.
If this remedy were imposed, the operating system monopoly
could no longer provide a basis for the abuse of market power. The
applications market would become much more competitive. At the
same time, by not breaking up the operating system company into
competing units, the potential problem of "fragmenting" the
operating system (i.e., creating incompatible versions) would be
avoided.
The Applications Company could not rely on the operating
system monopoly to maximize its profits. It would have to find new
revenues, like developing applications for non-Microsoft operating
systems (e.g., Linux), or encroaching on the operating systems market
by extending the functionality of its products to become
"middleware" (i.e., replicating the browser threat). It would have to
be more responsive to consumer demands-improving quality and
decreasing price.
With more applications available, and interoperability
expanding, non-Microsoft operating systems would become more
viable competitors to Windows. This would lead to more competitive
pressure on the Operating Company. It could not retaliate by
threatening to withhold its product or raising its prices, as it has done
in the past, lest competing operating systems become more attractive
to computer manufacturers and software developers, who would have
a real choice in PC operating systems for the first time in years.
185. Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Proposed Final Judgment, Declaration of
Paul Romer, Declaration of Carl Shapiro, Declaration of Rebecca Henderson, United
States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30, 44 (D.D.C. 2000) (Nos. CIV. A. 98-1232, 981233).
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This economic process would take time, but experience in the
software and other high tech industries suggests that real competition
would produce many integrated, consumer-friendly operating systems
that perform more reliably and better meet consumer needs. In a
world of competing systems, compatibility would become a highly
valued commodity and open standards would be developed.
Competitive industries center on standards to which all companies
can develop products. Non-dominant firms strive for enhanced
compatibility. The court makes this very point in dismissing
Microsoft's claim that it needed to require the installation of its
browser to prevent fragmentation of the Windows platform.
In a sense, the court's acceptance of the remedy tailors the
principles of antitrust to the new economy. It restores the
competitive process of the industry that has been assaulted by anticompetitive conduct, which is consistent with fundamental antitrust
principles.
The trial had shown that Microsoft has "monopoly power" and
that Microsoft's conduct plainly amounts to "a substantial antitrust
violation" (see Exhibit V-1). This extent of monopolization and its
abuse reflects a structural problem, not merely a problem with
unacceptable conduct. The key to the monopolization offense is, in
fact, that the conduct preserved or reinforced a monopoly that
otherwise would have been subject to competitive threats. Under
these circumstances, the leading antitrust treatise explains the
obligation of the court as follows: "[o]nce a firm found to have
monopoly power has committed a substantial antitrust violation the
optimal solution is to break up the monopoly and make the market
more structurally competitive without losing efficiencies made
86
possible by the monopolist's size and scope."1
The Supreme Court has long recognized that the effective
remedy to the competitive problem of the abuse of monopoly power
is to terminate the monopoly itself. 187 Professor Areeda observed that
the simplest and surest remedy for illegal monopolization is "the
restoration of competition through dissolution or dismemberment of
188
the monopolist into two or more viable competing units.

186. PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 207 (Supp.

1999).
187. See e.g., United States v. Grinnell, 384 U.S. 563, 577 (1966) (holding that a decree
should "break up or render impotent the monopoly power found to be in violation" of the
antitrust laws).
188. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 186.
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The Supreme Court has provided clear criteria to evaluate
appropriate relief for a monopolization violation. 189 Antitrust relief
should "pry open to competition a market that has been closed by [a]
defendant['s] illegal restraints."' 90 This suggests that a remedy should
not merely nibble around the edges of the monopolized market, but
should kick-start competition by making sufficiently fundamental
changes to allow competitors to rise or fall on their merits.' 91
The relief should "terminate the illegal monopoly."'g2 The decree
should prevent "practices likely to result in monopolization in the
fture."'193 The order should "deny to the defendant the fruits of its
statutory violation." 194 There is little dispute that antitrust relief
should avoid "transforming the district court into a regulatory
agency."' 195 A remedy that needs little ongoing supervision therefore
196
is superior to one that needs extensive supervision.

Identifying a set of conduct remedies that could be used to
address the antitrust violation is a daunting task because so many
anti-competitive aspects of Microsoft's behavior were demonstrated
at trial, especially in light of Microsoft's past and ongoing behavior
inside and outside of the courtroom. Having failed to convince the
court that it did not do the crime, Microsoft set about trying to
convince public opinion that it should not do the time. Outside of the
courtroom it commissioned studies to suggest that a strong remedy
would hurt the public. Relying on assumptions that have been
refuted in court, Microsoft's defenders have generated huge estimates
of disruption costs. 197 They assume that Microsoft has not exercised
any market power in the past, but that the operating system company
would start to do so after a break up. They assume the software
189. See Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562,577-78 (1972).
190. Id.
191. See United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 391 U.S. 244,250 (1968).
192. Id. (emphasis added).
193. 1L (emphasis added).
194. Id. (emphasis added).
195. JTC Petroleum Co. v. Piasa Motor Fuels, Inc., 190 F.3d 775, 780 (7th Cir. 1999)
(Posner, C.J.).
196. As the Supreme Court has observed, "the policing of an injunction would probably
involve the courts and the Government in regulation of private affairs more deeply than
the administration of a simple order of divestiture." United States v. DuPont & Co., 366
U.S. 316,334 (1961); see also United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131,167-68 (1982).
197. See Stan J. Liebowitz, Breaking Windows: Estimating the Cost of Breaking up
Microsoft Windows, ASS'N COMPETITIvE TECH AND THE ASCII GROUP, Apr. 30, 1999,
at 10; Stan J. Liebowitz, A Fool's Paradise: The Windows World After a Forced Breakup
of Microsoft, ASS'N COMPETIVE TECH., Feb. 25, 2000, at 12; Liebowitz, An Expensive
Pig,supra note 112, at 2-3.
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market could not develop compatibility functionality to sustain headto-head competition. as we know it. These assumptions were
discredited inside the courtroom during the trial and they are no less
wrong outside the courtroom after the trial.
A conduct remedy would have to be extensive, since Microsoft
has engaged in such a broad range of anti-competitive practices. The
policing of the remedy would have to be aggressive, since Microsoft
has shown itself to be recalcitrant both in its failure to comply with
the earlier consent decree and in its steadfast denial of wrongdoing in
this case. Even if Microsoft obeyed the decree, competition would be
slow to take root because Microsoft has dominated the operating
systems market for so long.
A comprehensive behavioral remedy would need specific
provisions to address each of the anti-competitive practices that
contributed to the violations of law and enforcement mechanisms that
have a reasonable chance of eliciting compliance or discovering and
rectifying non-compliance.
The transitional conduct remedies recommended by the court
are intended to give the new incentives a chance to take root by reigniting the competitive process in the industry. The conditions
placed on Microsoft behaviors address each of the identified anticompetitive practices thoroughly.
(1) Under the Table

For certain anti-competitive practices, the Conclusions of Law
stand as a remedy in themselves. The Conclusions of Law signal
strongly that this conduct is not acceptable.198 They may trigger
private and class action lawsuits. These could deprive Microsoft of
one of the most important fruits of its monopoly, the huge horde of
cash on hand. Given the manner in which the federal case was
conducted, that is the only way to get at the past fruits of monopoly
conduct.
(2) Applications Barrierto Entry

Behavioral conditions, such as disclosure requirements and
prohibitions on discrimination, must apply to the entire "Windows
Family" and the applications built on it. They must also apply to all
aspects of the interface between Microsoft and both distribution
channels and other software vendors.

198. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2000).
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(3) Contracting

It goes without saying that exclusive arrangements should not be
tolerated. However, the Court has recognized that preferential deals
are a powerful tool to preserve the monopoly. A prohibition on
discrimination should apply to prices, functionalities, support, testing,
marketing, and other considerations that Microsoft has used to
discriminate in the past.
(4) Quality Impairment

Porting of Office, disclosure of APIs and access to source code
will all help diminish Microsoft's ability to impair the quality of
competing or potentially competing products. A mechanism to
ensure non-discriminatory access will be crucial. Microsoft should
also be required to support older operating systems and to provide
training on new operating systems.
(5) Bundling

Microsoft should be required to spin off the browser. This is the
market that was monopolized and competition could yet be restored
in it. It is also an important choke point for leveraging other Internet
related markets. Other bundling issues will have to be referred to a
special master. However, the Court has established a clear test.
Where products can stand alone, they should be required to be
offered for sale separately.
(6) Price

The conduct remedy will not place immediate downward
pressure on operating system prices. Price discrimination can be
eliminated with a requirement to publish a uniform pricing schedule.
This will alleviate one major source of leverage over OEMs. The
practice of raising the price on older versions when new ones come
out should be banned. Older versions should also be supported for a
period. Two-way compatibility should be maintained. This will
alleviate the pressure to upgrade.
B. Antitrust Lessons Beyond the Case

While the economic literature recognizes that a large installed
base may be necessary to promote economies of scale and positive
network externalities, it also recognizes that large market shares
sustained over long periods may be harmful. The "benefits" of
having a firm that dominates an industry of this size and to this extent
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are doubtful. The "winner-take-most" outcome is far less of an
ironclad law than defenders of monopolies claim.199 The claim that
Schumpeterian monopoly is necessary for innovation has been
challenged. 2°° The empirical facts of the case also make it clear that
there are other outcomes that are far more competitive and
consumer-friendly.
(1)

Structure

Economic theory recognizes the uncertainty of outcomes. A
variety of stable market structures is possible. Technological "lockin" may short-circuit the innovation process.201 With the
reinforcement of network effects, small advantages gained early in
199. Michael L. Katz and Carl Shapiro, System Competition and Network Effects, 8 J.
ECON. PERSP. 93, 105-06 (1994) [hereinafter Katz & Shapiro, System Competition], argue
that competition between incompatible systems is possible, depending on consumer
heterogeneity. Paul Belleflamme, Stable Coalition Structures with Open Membership and
Asymmetric Firms, 30 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 1, 1-3 (2000), and Berd Woeckener, The
Competition of User Networks: Ergodicity, Lock-ins, and Metastability, 41 J. ECON.
BEHAV. & ORG. 85, 86-87 (2000), reach a similar conclusion in a different theoretic
framework. Timothy F. Bresnahan and Shane Greenstein, TechnologicalCompetition and
the Structure of the Computer Industry, 47 J. INDUS. ECON. 1, 5-8 (1999), envision a great
deal of competition within the layers of a platform and across layers in relatively short
periods of time. The description of IBM's mainframe platform provided by Franklin M.
Fisher, The IBM and Microsoft Cases: What's the Difference, 90 AM. ECON. REV., 180,
183 (1999), stresses both these points. See also Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Antitrust Enforcement
in Dynamic Network Industries, 43 ANTITRUST BULL. 859, 873-75 (1998); Willow A.
Sheremata, New Issues in Competition Policy Raised by Information Technology
Industries,43 ANTITRUST BULL. 547, 573-74 (1998) [hereinafter Sheremata, New Issues in
Competition].
200. SCHERER & Ross, supra note 15, at 660.
Viewed in their entirety, the theory and evidence suggest a threshold concept of
the most favorable climate for rapid technological change. A bit of monopoly
power in the form of structural concentration is conducive to innovation,
particularly when advances in the relevant knowledge base occur slowly. But very
high concentration has a positive effect only in rare cases, and more often it is apt
to retard progress by restricting the number of independent courses of initiative
and by dampening firms' incentive to gain market position through accelerated
R&D. Likewise, given the important role that technically audaciousnewcomers
play in making radical innovations, it seems important that barriers to new entry
be kept at modest level. Schumpeter was right in asserting that perfect
competition has no title to being established as the model of dynamic efficiency.
But his less cautious followers were wrong when they implied that powerful
monopolies and tightly knit cartels had a strong claim to that title. What is
needed for rapid technical progress is a subtle blend of competition and
monopoly, with more emphasis in general on the former than the latter, and with
the role of monopolistic elements diminishing when rich technological
opportunities exist.
id201. Sheremata, Barriersto Innovation,supra note 74, at 967.
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the process turn into substantial leads in the marketplace. 2 2 The
feedback process can lock in the wrong technology. 20 3 Once an
inferior technology is "locked-in," superior technologies may be
"locked-out. ''2°4 High fixed costs and low variable costs may slow
innovation. 205
The potential for inefficiency and market failure may exist, even
where positive network externalities exist. Consumer risk aversion
may bias them toward known technologies. 20 6 A herd mentality
makes it difficult for new technologies to enter the market.20 7 This
mentality tends to become a self-fulfilling prophecy.208 On the supply
side, sponsors and agents may play an "innocent" role in locking in
the wrong technology by giving an advantage to a solution to one
problem that unintentionally and inappropriately is applied to a
different problem. 209 Because the inferior solution is given a head
start, it takes hold.
One of the most important observations about the origins of a
positive feedback process is its openness in the early stages of
development. 210 In order to stimulate the complementary assets and
supporting services, and to attract the necessary critical mass of
customers, the technology must be open to adoption and
development by both consumers and suppliers.211 This openness
captures the critical fact that demand and consumers are
interrelated. 212 If the activities of firms begin to promote closed
214
technologies, 213 this is a clear sign that motivation may have shifted.
While it is clear in the literature that the installed base is important, it
202. Robin Cowan, Tortoises and Hares: Choice Among Technologies of Unknown
Merit,101 ECON. J. 807, 808 (1991).
203. Dominique Foray, The Dynamic Implications of IncreasingReturns: Technological
Change and Path Dependent Efficiency, 15 INT'L J. INDUS. ORG. 733, 748-49 (1997);
Schilling, supra note 41, at 268.
204. Joseph Farrel & Garth Saloner, Standardization,Compatibility,and Innovation, 16
RAND J. ECON. 70,70-83 (1986).
205. Id.
206. Cowan, supra note 202, at 809.
207. See Yoffie, supra note 103, at 23.
208. Katz & Shapiro, Antitrustand Software, supra note 37, at 438-39.
209. Foray, supranote 203, at 745.
210. Yoffie, supra note 103, at 21; see also Bresnahan & Greenstein, supra note 199, at
36-37; Katz & Shapiro, System Competition, supra note 199, at 103.
211. Schilling, supra note 41, at 280-81.
212. Katz & Shapiro, Antitrust in Software, supranote 37, at 424.
Jay Pil Choi, Network Externalities, Compatibility Choice and
213. See generally, id.;
Planned Obsolescence, 42 J. INDUS. ECON. 167 (1994).
214. Robin Mansell, Strategies for Maintaining Market Power in the Face of Rapidly
ChangingTechnologies, 31 J. ECON. ISSUES 969, 970 (1997).
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is not clear that an installed base must be so large that a single firm
can dominate the market. As long as platforms are open, the
installed base can be fragmented and still be large.215 In other words,
a large market share is not synonymous with a large market. 216 A
standard is not synonymous with a proprietary standard.217 Open
platforms and compatible products are identified as providing a basis
for network effects that is at least as dynamic as closed, proprietary
platforms 218 and much less prone to anti-competitive conduct.21 9
The installed base of computers is so large that it could support
multiple and competing operating systems, software packages, and
browsers that would be optimized to meet specific needs. Nor is there
any reason to believe that the installed base will be fragmented in the
sense that crossplatform applications and translations would not be
available to those who value them. Microsoft's number one enemy
was always compatibility that it could not control. No one ever
threatened to fragment the base, what they threatened to do was
migrate it to a platform that was broader and more inclusive than
Microsoft's. The only threat was to Microsoft's monopoly control
220
over the installed base.

215. Schilling, supra note 41, at 274.
216. Sheremata, Barriersto Innovation, supra note 74, at 965.
217. HAL VARIAN & KARL SHAPIRO, INFORMATION RULES (1999).
218. Bresnahan & Greenstein, supra note 199, at 36-37; Joseph Farrell & Michael L.
Katz, The Effect of Antitrust and Intellectual Property Law on Compatibility and
Innovation, 43 ANTITRUST BULL., 645, 650 (1998); Katz & Shapiro, System Competition,
supra note 199, at 109-12; Carmen Matutes & Pierre Regibeau, Mix and Match: Product
Compatibility Without Network Externalities,19 RAND J. ECON. 221-233 (1988).
219. Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Could Java Change Everything? The
Competitive Propriety of a Proprietary Standard, 43 ANTITRUST BULL. 715 (1998)
[hereinafter Lemley & McGowan; Could Java]; Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan,
Legal Implications of Network Effects, 86 CAL. L. REv. 479, 516-18 (1998) [hereinafter
Lemley & McGowan, Legal Implications].
220. Internet Tidal Wave, supra note 64 (identifies cross and multi-platform applications
as its fundamental challenge).
Apple benefited by having TCP support before we did and is working hard to
build a browser.., from OpenDoc components. Apple will push for OpenDoc
protocols to be used on the Internet, and is already offering good server
configurations....
Acrobat and quick time are popular on the network because they are cross
platform and the readers are free....
Netscape. Their browser.... They are pursuing a multi-platform strategy...
Over time the shell and the browser will converge and support
hierachical/listquery viewing as well as document with links viewing. The former
is the structured approach and the later allows for richer presentation. We need
to establish OLE protocols as the way rich documents are shared on the Internet.
I am sure the OpenDoc consortium will try and block this.
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The market outcome that most vigorously challenges the
proprietary "winner-take-most" model is a model that centers on
open standards. 221 Microsoft itself recognizes that the most important
developments in computing in post mainframe environment are open
standards, first the PC then the Internet.
The Internet is the most important single development to come
along since the IBM PC was introduced in 1981....
The Internet's unique position arises from a number of elements.
The TCP/IP protocols that define its transport level support
distributed computing and scale incredibly well. The Internet
Engineering Task Force (IETF) has defined an evolutionary path
that will avoid it running into future problems even as virtually
everyone on the planet connects up. The HTITP protocols that
define HTML Web browsers are extremely simple and have
allowed servers to handle incredible traffic reasonably well.222
Once the economic inevitability and superiority of a "winnertake-most" model is questioned, we confront the motivation to
monopolize. In spite of theoretical claims that monopolists have little
motivation to engage in such activities, there is ample evidence that
these anti-competitive behaviors may be attractive to a new economy
monopolist for a variety of reasons.223
" Market power in the core product can be preserved by
conquering neighboring markets, raising cross-platform
incompatibilities, raising rivals' costs, or preventing rivals from
achieving economies of scale.
*
Profits may be increased in the core product by enhanced
abilities to price discriminate.
*
By driving competitors out of neighboring markets, new
monopolies may be created or the ability to preserve market
power across generations may be enhanced by diminishing the
pool of potential competitors.

221. Lemley & McGowan, Could Java, supra note 219; Lemley & McGowan, Legal
Implications,supra note 219, at 515-23.
222. Id.
223. See Katz & Shapiro, Antitrust in Software, supra note 37, at 70-80; Lansuz A.
Ordover and Robert D. Willig, Access and Bundling in High Technology Markets, in
COMPETITION, INNOVATION AND THE MICROSoFr MONOPOLY: ANTITRUST AND THE
DIGITAL MARKETPLACE 107-08 (Jeffrey A. Eisenbach & Thomas M. Lenard eds., 1999);

Rubinfeld, supra note 199, at 877-81; Steven C. Salop, Using Leverage to Preserve
Monopoly, in COMPETITION, INNOVATION AND THE MICROSoFr MONOPOLY:
ANTrrRUST AND THE DIGITAL MARKETPLACE 93-96 (Jeffrey A. Eisenbach & Thomas

M. Lenard eds., 1999).
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In the end, economic theory does not resolve the issue, empirical
facts do. We look to the empirical facts, especially corporate
motivation and conduct, organized in the traditional antitrust
framework. In this case they are overwhelmingly on the side of
traditional market structure analysis and the antitrust laws. Despite
Microsoft's claims of a new competitive dynamic in these network,
new economy industries, the traditional rules of antitrust remain a
solid guide to pro-innovation, procompetitive, proconsumer public
policy. The warning signs remain the same.
* At the level of structure, we include the traditional warning signs
of large and persistent market shares, especially across
generations of intraplatform technological change and
domination of multiple products within layers of a platform.
*
In the high tech realm, domination of different layers of a
platform and steering of consumers to specific products across
layers of a platform should be a special concern. The installed
base of customers at one layer provides the base to compete
across layers.
(2) Conduct
Conduct and its intent should remain a central concern of
antitrust authorities, notwithstanding the claim that "winner-takemost" competition justifies all tactics to eliminate the competition.
Economic theory notes that it is especially critical to recognize that
the entrepreneur is not passive in the positive or negative aspects of
the lock-in process. 224 Sponsors have a variety of tools to create
economic and entry barriers that are counterproductive. What was
once the establishment of an installed base now becomes defense of
market dominance that reduces competition and reinforces the "lockout" of competing technologies. Having gained a controlling position,
2
firms may seek to implement isolating mechanisms. 2
Diffusion agents or technology sponsors can use a wide range of
actions to advance their technology. 226- Precisely because certain

224. See Towhidul Islam & Miel Mead, The Diffusion of Successive Generations of a
Technology: A More GeneralModel, 36 TECH. FORECASTING SOC. CHANGE 389 (1997);
Christos Skiadas, Innovation Diffusion Models Expressing Asymmetry and/or Positive or
Negatively Influencing Forces,TECH. FORECASTING SOC. CHANGE 316 (1986).
225. Richard Makadok, Can First-Moverand Early Mover Advantages Be Sustained in
an Industry with Low Barriers to Entry/Imitation?, 19 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 683, 685
(1996).
226. Ulrich Witt, "Lock-in" vs. "Critical Masses"-IndustrialChange Under Network
Externalities,15 INT'L J. INDUS. ORG., 753, 768-69 (1997).

April 2001]

ANTITRUST AS CONSUMER PROTECTION

characteristics of the process lend themselves to intervention by
"sponsors," there is ample room for self-interested action that

furthers the private sponsor's interest at the expense of the public
interest. 227

The public good aspect of efforts to achieve critical

mass-to organize the switch to a new technology-cannot be
assumed to outweigh the private motivation in such actions. 228 Thus,
a critical step is to look at actual firm behavior.229
A dominant firm may create barriers to entry through exclusive

deals,2 30 retaliation against those who deal with competitors,2 31
manipulation of standards and support for competing products,2 32
strategies that freeze customers,2 33 and the exercise of property rights
through restrictive licensinge 3 4 patents and copyrights.2 35 These
business strategies create inertia and prevent competitors from
gaining market share. Companies can leverage their access to
customers to reinforce their market dominance.2 36 This access allows
them to bundle-complementary assets.2 37
It is well recognized that dominant firms tend to blur distinctions

between markets with bundling and integration of functions, so it is
particularly important to consider the points of interface or
interconnection between markets since this is where market power
can be leveraged 38 Additional control points that may emerge in the
gateway to e-commerce make the market power analysis particularly
important.239 Given the threat of lock-in and the advantages of being
227. See Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Installed Base and Compatibility: Innovation,
Product Preannouncementsand Predation,76 AM. ECON. REv. 940, 948-51 (1986).
228. See Michael Katz & Carl Shapiro, ProductInnovation with Network Externalities,
40 J.INDus. ECON. 55,73 (1992).
229. Robin Mansell, Strategies for Maintaining Market Power in the Face of Rapidly
Changing Technologies,31 J. ECON. ISSUES 969, 970 (1997).
230. See Schilling, supra note 41, at 276.
231. See Sheremata, New Issues in Competition, supra note 199, at 560-61; Glenn A.
Woroch et al., Exclusionary Behavior in the Market for Operating System Software: The
Case of Microsoft, in OPENING NETWORKS TO COMPETITION: THE REGULATION OF

PRICE AND ACCESS (David Gabel & David Weiman eds., 1997).
232. See Sheremata, New Issues in Competition, supra note 199, at 560; see also
FERGUSON, supra note 137, at 307; Lemley & McGowan, Could Java, supra note 219, at
732.
233. See Farrel & Katz, supranote 218, at 643-45; Sheremata,
New
Issues
in
Competition,supra note 199, at 566.
234. Katz & Shapiro, Antitrust and Software, supra note 37, at 75.
235. Schilling, supra note 41, at 279.
236. Makadok, supra note 225, at 693.
237. Yoffie, supra note 103, at 26; see also Robert E. Dansby & Cecilia Conrad,
Commodity Bundling,74 AM. ECON. REv. 377 (1984).
238. Mansell, supra note 229, at 977.
239. Id. at 982-83.
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a dominant firm, the second generation of discrimination may rely on
much subtler forms of discrimination.2 40 This second generation of
discrimination is difficult to detect and root out.
Bundling, which may play a key role in creating the critical mass
for positive externalities during the early period of adoption of a
technology that provides the benefit of convenience for consumers
throughout the product life cycle, can also play a role in exploiting
customers.241 When combined with market power, bundling results in
overpricing of products in the aggregate.2 42 The conclusion is
strongest with monopoly bundling, as is the case with Microsoft's
browser, but extends to other situations as well.2 43
"
Traditional marketing practices that tie products and predatory
pricing remain a concern.
" Classic practices, such as refusal to deal with complements or
competitors, retaliation for dealing with competitors, price
discrimination and rebating, and foreclosure of distribution for
competitors are still a cause for concern.
* In the high tech environment, manipulation of standards to
disadvantage competitors or withdrawal of support for
complements or competitors and lock-in contracts for core
products or complements, including long terms, minimum
commitments, and "preannouncement" of features to freeze
customers become new concerns.
" Conduct that closes standards or frustrates cross platform
compatibility and competition are the most egregious offenses,
since these destroy the most dynamic economies available.
(3) Performance

Performance of the industry must be considered in terms of
price, 244 innovation (quality)2 45 and competitive process. 246 The

240. See Lopatka & Page, supra note 34, at 363.
241. See Carmen Matutes and Pierre Regibeau, Compatibility and Bundling of
Complementary Goods in a Duopoly, 50 J. INDUS. ECON. 46 (1992).
242. Joseph P. Guiltnan, The PriceBundling of Services: A Normative Framework,51 J.
MKTG. 74 (1987).
243. Lester Telser, A Theory of Monopoly of Complementary Goods, 52 J. BUS. 211-30
(1979); Richard Schmalensee, Gaussian Demand and Commodity Bundling, 57 J. BUS.
211-30.
244. See FERGUSON, supra note 137, at 308-09; Sheremata, New Issues in Competition,
supra note 199, at 560.
245. See HEILEMAN, supra note 6, at 91-93. Sheremata, New Issues in Competition,
supra note 199, at 566, argues "[h]owever, the fact that the monopolist has innovated is not
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reward for successful anti-competitive activity is the ability to impose
pricing patterns on the public that exploit market power and allow the

dominant firm to control the direction and pace of innovation to
protect its interest. 247
The economic literature recognizes that the introduction of, and
the reliance upon, price discrimination after the initial round of
positive growth is a crucial factor. Price discrimination undermines
the value of existing products by creating incompatibilities. 248 This
extracts consumer surplus. 249 Price discrimination allows firms to
manage the cannibalization process. That is, introducing later
versions of a product does not eliminate the ability to extract

consumer surplus, as long as price discrimination occurs.250
Advertising and distribution will shift in nature from an open and
expansive focus to a proprietary emphasis,2 1 while control over the
52
product cycle can impose immense costs through forced upgrades
Indirect costs through greater and accelerated demands on hardware
may actually be several times larger than the direct costs of hardware
53
and software.2
* As we have shown, traditional concerns about high and rising
prices remain pertinent. Monopoly rents provide the resources
to execute anti-competitive strategies and these can be measured
in terms of excess profits.
* In high tech industries, compulsory and coercive upgrading
policies are a concern, as they exploit switching costs to extract

consumer surplus.
the most relevant point. Most relevant to social welfare is whether the monopolist
innovated more than a set of competing firms would have."
246. See FERGUSON, supra note 137, at 311 (linking the lack of competition to slowing
of innovation).
247. See Michael Katz & Carl Shapiro, R&D Rivalry with Licensing or Imitation, 77
AM. ECON. REV. 403,411 (1987); Michael Waldman, Planned Obsolescence and the R&D
Decision,27 RAND J. ECON. 583, 590-92 (1996).
248. Choi, supra note 213, at 171-73.
249. Id. at 176-77.
250. K. Sridhar Moorthy, Market Segmentation, Self Selection, and Product Lines
Design, 3 MKTG. Sci. 303 (1984); Marcel Thum, Network Externalities, Technological
Progress,and the Competition of Market Contracts, 94 INT. J. INDUS. ORG. 280, 285-86
(1997).
251. John R. Hauser & Steven M. Shugani, Defensive Marketing Strategies, 2 MKTG.
Sci. 319 (1983) (finding a basis to decrease awareness advertising, decrease distribution
budget and increase price, late in the product cycle).
252. See Glenn Ellison & Drew Fudenberg, The Neo-Luddite's Lament: Excessive
Upgradesin the Software Industry, 30 RAND J. ECON. 253,272 (2000); Drew Fudenberg &
Jean Tirole, Upgrades, Trade-ins,and Buybacks, 28 RAND J. ECON. 235,236 (1998).

253. See FERGUSON, supra note 137, at 309-10.
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Measuring impacts on quality and innovation is the most difficult
aspect of market performance to assess. Slowing of innovation
through the delay or prevention of products is one area of
concern. Sloppy design and reduced or unstable performance
are additional concerns.
*
Creation of and/or indifference to consumer inconvenience also
emerge as a concern.
It would be reasonable for antitrust officials confronted with
questions about anti-competitive practices in high technology
industries to act only when they observe warning signs at each of the
levels of analysis. The Microsoft case presents mountains of evidence
of many violations at every level. In the end, this case is not about
new, high technology industries. It is about old anti-competitive
business practices that have been illegal for over a century.
"

C. Conclusion: The Consumer Lesson of the Microsoft Case
Perhaps the most important lesson that can be learned from the
court's careful consideration of the multiple forms of harm is that
consumers need not fear real competition in the software industry or
the new economy. Can we expect a competitive market to be as
efficient and "consumer friendly" as the Microsoft monopoly?
Given the fact that Microsoft has undermined successful
products from profitable companies, there is every reason to believe
that consumers would receive products that are better at lower prices
if the anti-competitive practices were eliminated. The ability of
developers to create products that are compatible, which Microsoft
then drives out of the market with anti-competitive tactics, suggests
that if Microsoft were prevented from abusing its market power, a
competitive market would produce compatible products. Fears that
competition will cause computing to become more difficult, requiring
support of multiple, incompatible applications and operating systems,
are unfounded. If the installed base of more than 300 million
computers were divided between competitors, interoperability would
be seen as a premium quality. OEMs could purchase and choose
from a number of bundles and companies could profitably write
programs to any of them. Portability will be highly valued in the
market.
In fact, Microsoft has fought against software compatibility in
market after market. Over time, as Microsoft's market share has
grown, it has built more and more barriers to interoperability
between Windows and other operating systems or application
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software. Microsoft is not actually concerned about incompatibility
when it controls that incompatibility and it suits its business interests.
The threat to the public has grown with each subsequent conquest of
a market.
The ultimate irony is that Microsoft's pricing and marketing
pattern imposes the greatest burden on the very consumers that it
claims to be helping most with its preinstallation and bundling of
software.25 4 The least sophisticated consumers are the most likely to
take the packages and upgrades and least likely to find the
alternatives that Microsoft has driven into niches in the market.
These consumers cannot find bundles that suit their limited needs, so
they are forced to "buy up" both in the initial purchase and with
upgrades.
At its heart, the arguments against a break-up are essentially a
defense of monopoly in the industry. The trial undermines the claim
that the monopoly persists because of the unique natural forces of the
software market. The causes of its durability are to be found in the
plain old anti-competitive business practices of Microsoft. Real
competition, even in this new economy industry, is not likely to
impose the costs that its critics claim; it is likely to deliver the benefits
consumers have come to expect from truly competitive markets.
Thus, the lesson for consumers and antitrust policy makers to be
drawn from the successful prosecution of the Microsoft case is clearantitrust properly focused on competition should be a powerful form
of consumer protection in the new economy, as it was in the old.
Just over a century ago, the antitrust laws were adopted and
applied when America was taking leadership of the world's industrial
economy. Break-ups of the major industrial corporations at that time
were intended to prevent abuse and restore competition to the most
important industries of the industrial age. Claims that preventing the
concentration of economic resources would hurt the economy were
raised at that time and they proved to be wrong, for exactly the same
reasons they are wrong today. Competition is the wellspring of
economic progress and technological innovation in our capitalist
economy, and antitrust law still has a critical role to play in promoting
and protecting competition.
The purpose of antitrust is not to pick or punish winners, it is to
ensure that the contest is fair, because only a fair contest elicits effort
that gets maximum progress. By any reasonable evaluation of
Microsoft's behavior, it broke the rules.
The Microsoft case
254. Id. at 310.
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represents much more than good courtroom drama. It is the first
antitrust test of the new economy and it will go a long way toward
determining the role of antitrust in the Internet century. Importantly,
the Microsoft case teaches that classic antitrust law and trial evidence
still matter.
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EXHIBIT I-1:
THE CASE AGAINST THE MICROSOFT MONOPOLY
FACT
(Paragraph No.)

LAW
(Page No.)

18-21,33-35

4,5

19,20,22-27,54-55
30,36-43,141,166

4,6
4,5,6

390,394
106,129,236,355
88,105
390,394
139,260,2951
107,137-139,147

18
6,10
10,22

143,147,230-234, 247,259-260
287-290,293-297,305-306,317-321,
326-326,332,337,339-340,350-352
139,272,301
64,118,236-238,324
10,19,103
90-92,128-129,160,330,339-340
240,357,379,396-406
129,387-396,404-406
160,170-172
90,122,128-129,192,405-406

10,15,37,38

159,170,198
133-134,166

4,11,12,31
10,18,19,22

MARKET STRUCUTURE
MONOPOLY POSITION
BARRIERS TO ENTRY
Hardware
Software

CONDUCT
UNDER THE TABLE
Abrogation Of Contracts
Intimidation
Market Division
Patent Infringement
Reverse Bounty
Predation
CONTRACT PROVISIONS
Exclusive Deals
Preferred Desktop Location
Secret Price
Indirect Sales
Quality Impairment
Resource Denial
Incompatibility/Integration
Disabling
Desupporting
BUNDLING
OS Tying
Imitation

6,20
6,10,16,21,22

17,20
6,10,11
4,6,10
6,11
31
18,19
11,31,32
10,18

PERFORMANCE
RETARDING INNOVATION
Chilling Effect on Investment,
379,397,412
Developer Time and Money
Delay or Prevent Development 411, 132,395-396
Netscape's Navigator
81-88,408-410
116-118,125-130
IBM's OS2/Smartsuite
Sun's JAVA
397-403
111-114
Real Networks
104-110
Apple's Quicktime
94-103
Intel's Native Signaling
Processing
390-396,407
Undermining Compatibility
DENIAL OF CONSUMER CHOICE
Deny Products Consumer Needs 247,410
167-168
Delaying Release of Products
Deny Consumers User-Friendly 210-216
Force New Versions in New PC 57,66
90-91,93
Deny or Delay Non-Microsoft

10,18,19
22
10
18
10
10
6
6,18,19
11

6
10,11
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Thwart Responses to Demand
Forcing Consumers to Buy
In Inconvenient Ways
DEGRADATION OF QUALITY
Impair MS Functionality
Reducing the Availability
Impair the Nonms Functionality

11,14
225-229
133,143,203-20611
239-240,247,309-311,357,359-361 10,15

173,174
407
92,128-129,
160,171-172,330,339,340
DIRECT INCREASES IN CONSUMER COST
57,62-63
Short Term Revenue
Price Discrimination/Secret Price 64,118,236-238,324
66
Undermining' Long
Term Competition
MONOPOLISTIC PRICING PRACTICES
10,18-19,58,103
Hidden Price/Indirect Sales
62-63,66
Overcharges
107,137-139,261-262
Cross-Subsidy/Predation
66,379
Excess Profits
INDIRECT INCREASES IN CONSUMER COSTS
203-206, 239-240,247
Raising Consumer
Transaction Cost
Raising Hardware Costs
57,66
Upgrade Policy
173-174,210-216
Excess Functionality

11
18,19
6,10,11,17,32
6
4,6,10,11
6
4,6,10
6
10,21,22
6
11
6
6,11,32
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EXHIBIT MI-1
MICROSOFT'S DOMINATION OF SOFTWARE
CATEGORIES
PERSONAL FINANCE
INTUIT
DATABASE
BORLAND
SPREADSHEET
VISICALC

75
59

_

51

LOTUS
WORD PROCESSING
WORDSTAR

40

I

IAO

WORDPERFECT

-to

OPERATING SYSTEMS
CPM

?

MICROSOPT
ACCESS
EXCEL
WORD
DOS/WINDOWS

1974

1977

62
69
70
93

1981

1984

1987

1993 1996

NOTES: "- -" represents non-dominant years in market;
"represents dominant
years in market.
SOURCE: Schmalensee, Direct Testimony, Table 2. Evans, Nichols and Reddy, The
Rise andFall of Leaders in PersonalComputer Software
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EXIBIT I1-2:
REALITY OF INSTALLED BASE OF
OPERATING SYSTEMS
300
250
200
150
100
50
0

J

0

01c1

OPERATING SYSTEM
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EXIBIT IV-1:
OPERATING SYSTEM PRICES
STREET ca)

OEM
1981b)
1990c)
1996c)
1998d)

$40
19
49
53

na
138
na
179

(a) Kenneth G. Elzinga & David E. Mills, PC SOFTWARE, Sept. 1998, at 51.
(b) David S. Evans et al., The Rise and Fall of Leaders in Personal Computer
Software, NAT'L ECON. RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, Jan. 7,1999, p. 4.
(c) Government Exhibit #365: Memorandum from Joachim Kempin to Bill
Gates Dated Dec. 16, 1997, United States v. Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d 9
(D.D.C. 1999) (Nos. CIV. A. 98-1232, 98-1233).
(d) Bloomberg reports on sealed testimony in which Microsoft admits that it
has ceased remitting to OEMs $4 per operating system for advertising costs.
This results in an effective price increase to OEMs of $4 per system.
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EXIUBIT IV-2:
IDENTIFYING MONOPOLY OVERCHARGES PRICE

$50+

$50
$40

I
I

MONOPOLY
PERIOD

I

I

OVERCHARGES
BASED ON
CURRENT CASE

COMPETITIVE
PERIOD
$19

"-.

I%

HISTORIC
TREND

1981

1981

II

I I

%"%

190

196

199

1990

1996

1998

887

ANTITRUST AS CONSUMER PROTECTION

April 2001]

EXHIBIT IV-3:
PROFITABILITY OF THE COMPUTER INDUSTRY
WINTEL
MS
INTEL

REMAINDER OF COMPUTER INDUSTRY
SEMI
ALL
HARD
SOFT

ALL
INDUSTRY

RETURN ON
EQUITY
1996
32
1997
34
1998
29
27
1999

36
35
28
25

18
17
14
17

14
17
14
25

17
11
0
6

14
17
12
18

17
17
16
15

PROFIT
MARGIN
1996
1997
1998
1999

25
28
23
24

6
7
5
7

6
5
4
7

3
6
1
3

5
6
4
7

6
6
6
6

26
30
38
41

Source: Bus. WK., various issues.
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EXIMIT IV-4
THE EXTENT OF EXERCISE OF MONOPOLY PRICING
POWER: ALTERNATIVE ASSUMPTIONS
AND CONCLUSIONS
Schmalensee (a) Fisher (b)

EMPIRICAL (c) (d)

Date for analysis

1997

1999

1996

1998

1998

CPU assumed

NA

NA

x86

High

Low

PC Price

$2000

$1000

$2000

$1500

$1000

Intel Role

None

None

Operating System/
CPU price

$50

$65

$286

$220

$100

Complementary
Revenue

$100

$150

$150

$150

$150

4

4

4

$371

$227

$100

77

97

100

Elasticity of
Demand (d)
Profit Maximizing
Monopoly Price
Actual Price as a
% of Maximum
Monopoly Price

$1750

Co-Monopolist

(a) Report of Direct Testimony of Richard Schmalensee, United States v.
Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 1999) (Nos. CIV. A. 98-1232, 981233).
(b) Rebuttal Testimony of Franklin Fisher taken on June 1 and 2, 1999,
United States v. Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 1999) (Nos. CIV. A. 981232, 98-1233).
(c) Government Exhibit #365: Memorandum from Joachim Kempin to Bill
Gates Dated Dec. 16, 1997, United States v. Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d 9
(D.D.C. 1999) (Nos. CIV. A. 98-1232, 98-1233).
(d) Government Exhibit # 439: PC Value Analysis Cy 1990 - Cy 1996,
March 4, 1996, United States v. Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 1999)
(Nos. CIV. A. 98-1232, 98-1233).
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EXHIBIT IV-5
MICROSOFT'S STRATEGY FOR DEFENDING
MONOPOLY PROFITS BY BUNDLING OPERATING
SYSTEMS INTO CPU
PRICE
ESTIMATE
Windows 2000 (W2k) Assuming
Current Market Situation
W2k (OS)
Intel CPU
Total

BUNDLING/BOLTING COMPETITION
Intel Bundles OS
or
Microsoft Buys CPU & Bundles OS

CONSUMER
SAVINGS

$ 100 - 120
170 - 180
$ 270 -300

200

70 - 100

170 - 175

100 - 125

Competitive CPU

20 - 30
70 - 75

80 - 90
100 - 105

Total

90 - 105

180 - 195

FULL COMPONENT COMPETITION
Competitive OS

Source: Government Exhibit #365: Memorandum from Joachim Kempin to
Bill Gates Dated Dec. 16, 1997, United States v. Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d 9
(D.D.C. 1999) (Nos. CIV. A. 98-1232, 98-1233).

